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“E

nvironmental justice” means many things to
many people. To local communities feeling overburdened by environmental hazards and left out of the
decisionmaking process, it captures their sense of the unfairness of the development, implementation, and enforcement
of environmental laws and policies. To regulated entities
facing allegations that they have created or contributed to
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Article. The author would like to thank University of Michigan Law
School students Brian Gruber and Dustin Pickens for their research assistance, the University of Michigan Law School for supporting the research
on which this Article is based, and Luke Cole, Kirsten Engel, Paul Mohai,
Rena Steinzor, Dean Suagee, and Elizabeth Teel for their helpful comments on an earlier draft.

injustices, environmental justice is an amorphous term
that wrongly suggests racial-based or class-based animus
or, at the very least, indifference to the public health and
welfare of distressed communities. The company may believe it did not even create, or at most only plays a small
role in causing or solving, the community’s problems. To
government officials often the target of environmental
justice activists’ ire, the term may imply that they are executing their responsibilities in a biased or callous manner.
Caught in the middle between local residents and industry, the call for environmental justice may pressure
agency officials to move from a well-established, technocratic decisionmaking approach to a largely undefined,
populist approach that encompasses issues beyond the
comfortable domain of the agency.
Efforts to understand environmental justice are further
complicated by the term’s international, national, and local
scope; by its broad definition of the environment—where
one lives, works, plays, and goes to school; and by its broad
range of concerns—such as public health, natural resource
conservation, and worker safety in both urban and rural environs. Disputes at the international level include allegations that governments and multinational corporations are
exploiting indigenous peoples and the impoverished conditions of developing nations. At the national level, although an overwhelming number of studies show differences by race and income in exposures to environmental
hazards, debate continues about the strength of that evidence and the appropriate political and legal response to
such disparities. At the local level, many people of color
and lower income communities believe that they have not
been treated fairly regarding the distribution of the environmental benefits and burdens.
Over the past decade during which communities, academics, regulated firms, and government officials have
struggled with issues of the relationship of environmental
quality to race and class, the quest to explain the essence of
the problems underlying environmental justice disputes has
been manifested in the varying terminology and definitions
used to refer to such disputes. This Article contends that
such efforts have largely failed to capture the essence and
breadth of the different types of environmental justice concerns alleged at the international, national, and local levels.
The Article instead proposes a four-part categorization
of environmental justice issues: (1) distributive justice;
(2) procedural justice; (3) corrective justice; and (4) social
justice. This taxonomic approach, which moves beyond definitions and expands upon the earlier works of Dr. Robert
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Bullard and others,1 offers a method of collapsing the seemingly broad scope of environmental justice and identifying
common causes of and solutions to environmental injustice.
At its heart, this taxonomy seeks to identify the “justice”
embodied in the concept of environmental justice.
Shifting Perspectives and Uses of Terms
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) initially
used the term “environmental equity,” defined as the equitable distribution of environmental risks across population
groups, to refer to the environmental justice phenomenon.2
Because this term implies the redistribution of risk across
racial and economic groups rather than risk reduction and
avoidance, it is no longer used by EPA, though it is still used
by some states.3
In some instances, the phrase “environmental racism,”
defined as “any policy, practice or directive that differentially affects or disadvantages (whether intended or unintended) individuals, groups, or communities based on race
or color,”4 is used to explain the differential treatment of
populations on environmental issues. Commentators disagree over the proper usage of this term, particularly over
whether an action having an unequal distributive outcome
across racial groups would in itself be a sufficient basis to
label an action environmental racism or whether the action
must be the result of intentional racial animus.5 Today,
many environmental justice advocates and scholars avoid
the term “environmental racism,” though the phrase continues to be employed and is useful in identifying the insti1. Professor Bullard was the first to propose classifying environmental
justice concerns and defined three different equity categories: procedural, geographic, and social. See Robert D. Bullard, Dumping
in Dixie 116 (2d ed. 1994); Robert D. Bullard, Overcoming Racism
in Environmental Decisionmaking, 36 Env’t 11, 12-15 (1994). Professor Kenneth Manaster later argued that three concepts of justice
support the philosophical foundations of environmental law: distributive justice, corrective justice, and procedural justice. Kenneth A.
Manaster, Environmental Protection and Justice 23 (1995).
Professor Alice Kaswan organized environmental justice into two
categories: distributive justice and political justice. Alice Kaswan,
Environmental Justice: Bridging the Gap Between Environmental
Laws and “Justice,” 47 Am. U. L. Rev. 221, 230 (1997). Professor
Dorceta Taylor observed that the environmental justice movement is
concerned with two kinds of justice: distributive justice and corrective or commutative justice. Dorceta E. Taylor, The Rise of the Environmental Justice Paradigm, 43 Am. Behav. Sci. 508, 537 (2000).
2. See U.S. EPA, Reducing Risk for All Communities, Vol. 1:
Workgroup Report to the Administrator 2 (1992).
3. See Eileen Gauna, Federal Environmental Citizen Provisions: Obstacles and Incentives on the Road to Environmental Justice, 22
Ecology L.Q. 1, 27-29 (1995).
4. Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Racism and “Invisible” Communities, 96 W. Va. L. Rev. 1037, 1037 (1993-1994); Robert D.
Bullard, Leveling the Playing Field Through Environmental Justice,
23 Vt. L. Rev. 453, 465 (1999). The phrase “environmental discrimination” has also been used to refer to the “disparate treatment of
a group or community based on race, class, or some other distinguishing characteristic” and includes the “process of defending one
group’s privilege gained at the expense of another.” Bullard,
Dumping in Dixie, supra note 1, at 24-25. Professor Dorceta Taylor defines environmental racism or environmental discrimination as
“the process by which environmental decisions, actions, and policies
result in racial discrimination.” Taylor, supra note 1, at 536.
5. See Jill E. Evans, Challenging the Racism in Environmental Racism:
Redefining the Concept of Intent, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 1219, 1273-77
(1998); Sheila Foster, Race(ial) Matters: The Quest for Environmental Justice, 20 Ecology L.Q. 721, 733-38 (1993); Gerald
Torres, Introduction: Understanding Environmental Racism, 63 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 839, 839-40 (1992).
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tutional causes of some environmental injustices. This
shift is attributable to a desire to focus on solutions rather
than mere identification of problems, as well as a desire to
encompass class concerns and not to be limited by issues of
intentional conduct.
In 1994, President Clinton issued Executive Order No.
12898, “Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice
in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations,” and
adopted the phrase “environmental justice” to refer to “disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects . . . on minority populations and low-income
populations.”6 Rather than explicitly defining the phrase,
the Executive Order elaborated on its meaning by requiring
each federal agency to develop strategies to achieve environmental justice by, at a minimum: (1) identifying and addressing disproportionately high and adverse human health
or environmental effects of agency programs, policies,
and activities on minority populations and low-income
populations; (2) promoting enforcement of all health and
environmental statutes in areas with minority or low-income populations; (3) ensuring greater public participation; (4) improving research and data collection relating
to the health and environment of minority and low-income populations; and (5) identifying differential patterns of consumption of natural resources among minority and low-income populations.7
The Executive Order’s use of the term “environmental
justice” is significant in at least three respects. First, the Executive Order focuses not only on the disproportionate burdens addressed by the term environmental equity, but also
on issues of enforcement of environmental laws and opportunities for public participation. Second, the Executive Order identifies not just minorities but also low-income populations as the groups who have been subject to, and entitled
to relief from, unfair or unequal treatment. Finally, the Executive Order, and in particular the accompanying memorandum, refers to environmental justice as a goal or aspiration
to be achieved, rather than as a problem or cause.
In 1998, EPA’s Office of Environmental Justice set forth
the Agency’s “standard definition” of environmental justice:
The fair treatment of people of all races, cultures, incomes, and educational levels with respect to the devel6. Exec. Order No. 12898, 3 C.F.R. 389 (1994), reprinted in 42
U.S.C. §4321 (1994), Admin. Mat. 45075. The federal government’s Interagency Working Group on Environmental Justice
states that a “low-income population” should be identified using
the U.S. Census’ annual statistical poverty thresholds from the U.S.
Bureau of Census. Interagency Working Group on Environmental Justice, Guidance for Federal Agencies on Key
Terms in Executive Order 12,898 (1995), reprinted in Council on Environmental Quality, Executive Office of the
President, Environmental Justice: Guidance Under the
National Environmental Policy Act, app. A (1997). The Interagency Working Group guidance defines “minority” as any person who is American Indian or Alaskan Native; Asian or Pacific Islander; Black; or Hispanic. “Minority populations” are where either the minority population of the affected area exceeds 50% or the
minority percentage is meaningfully greater than the minority population in the general population or other appropriate unit of geographic analysis.
7. Exec. Order No. 12898, supra note 6, §1-103(a). For a further discussion of the Executive Order and its terms, see the memorandum
accompanying the Executive Order and the Interagency Working
Group’s guidance on key terms in the Executive Order. Presidential
Memorandum Accompanying Executive Order 12898, 30 Weekly
Comp. Pres. Doc. 279 (Feb. 11, 1994) (available from the ELR
Document Service, ELR Order No. AD-1134); Interagency
Working Group on Environmental Justice, supra note 6.
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opment and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies. Fair treatment implies that no population should be forced to shoulder a disproportionate
share of exposure to the negative effects of pollution due
to lack of political or economic strength.8

Going beyond the issues of disproportionate exposures
and participation in the development and enforcement of
laws and policies, EPA further elaborated that environmental justice:
is based on the premise that: 1) it is a basic right of all
Americans to live and work in “safe, healthful, productive, and aesthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings”; 2) it is not only an environmental issue but a public
health issue; 3) it is forward-looking and goal-oriented;
and 4) it is also inclusive since it is based on the concept
of fundamental fairness, which includes the concept of
economic prejudices as well as racial prejudices.9

Professor Bunyan Bryant defines environmental justice
as referring “to those cultural norms and values, rules, regulations, behaviors, policies, and decisions to support sustainable communities, where people can interact with confidence that their environment is safe, nurturing, and protective.”10 Some critics of environmental justice contend that
these definitions of environmental justice by government
agencies and environmental justice advocates are so broad
and aspirational as not to state clearly the ends of environmental justice.11
An alternative approach to defining environmental justice that does state its desired ends, albeit very ambitious
ones, was developed by environmental justice leaders during the 1991 First People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit. Its “Principles of Environmental Justice” sets
forth a 17-point paradigm that includes, inter alia, a call for
the cessation of the production of all toxins, hazardous
8. Memorandum from Barry E. Hill, Director, Office of Environmental
Justice, EPA, to Deputy Regional Administrators, EPA et al. (Dec.
16, 1998) (on file with author) (quoting Office of Solid Waste
and Emergency Response, U.S. EPA, Guide to Environmental Issues—Earth Day 25 Edition (EPA/OSWER Directive
No. 520/B-94-001 (Apr. 1995)). For an earlier and slightly less expansive definition, see U.S. EPA, Environmental Justice
Strategy: Executive Order 12898 1-2 (1995) (available from the
ELR Document Service, ELR Order No. AD-1177).
According to EPA, to be classified as an “environmental justice
community”:
residents must be a minority and/or low income group; excluded from the environmental policy setting and/or decision-making process; subject to a disproportionate impact
from one or more environmental hazards; and experience a
disparate implementation of environmental regulations, requirements, practices and activities in their communities.
U.S. EPA, What Is Environmental Justice? (visited Mar. 9, 2000)
<http://es.epa.gov/oeca/main/ej/faq.html>.
9. Memorandum from Barry E. Hill, supra note 8. A somewhat more
expansive government definition by the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences states: “[Environmental justice] upholds
those cultural norms and values, rules, regulations, and policies or
decisions to support sustainable communities . . . is supported by
clean air, water and soil . . . is supported by democratic
decisionmaking and personal empowerment.” National Inst. of
Envtl. Health Sciences, Symposium on Health Research
and Needs to Ensure Environmental Justice: Executive
Summary of Recommendations ii (1994).
10. Bunyan Bryant, Introduction, in Environmental Justice: Issues,
Policies, and Solutions 1, 6 (Bunyan Bryant ed., 1995).
11. See Christopher H. Foreman Jr., The Promise and Peril of
Environmental Justice 11-13 (1998).

wastes, and radioactive materials; recognizes the fundamental right to political, economic, cultural, and environmental self-determination of all peoples; holds all producers
of waste strictly accountable for damages and protects the
right of victims of environmental injustice to receive full
compensation and reparations; demands the right to participate as equal partners at every level of decisionmaking; affirms the right of all workers to a safe and healthy work environment; and recognizes the special legal and natural relationship of native peoples to the U.S. government.12
Dr. Robert Bullard has distilled the principles of environmental justice into a framework of five basic characteristics:
(1) protect all persons from environmental degradation;
(2) adopt a public health prevention of harm approach;
(3) place the burden of proof on those who seek to pollute;
(4) obviate the requirement to prove intent to discriminate;
and (5) redress existing inequities by targeting action and resources.13 In his view, environmental justice seeks to make
environmental protection more democratic and asks the
fundamental ethical and political questions of “who gets
what, why and how much.”14
Though these definitions and principles are essential to
understanding the environmental justice phenomenon, my
experience in teaching the subject suggests that neither fully
informs the audience of the similarity of themes and concerns that arise in environmental justice disputes. Students
and lawyers are often left without an understanding of unifying themes or common political, legal, or economic approaches to addressing allegations of injustice. The classification method set forth in this Article seeks to overcome this
shortcoming and to advance the understanding of environmental justice by disassembling the term into the four traditional notions of “justice” that are implicated by allegations
of environmental injustice.
Environmental Justice as Distributive Justice
Of the four aspects of justice implicated by the use of the
term environmental justice, distributive justice concerns
have received the most attention from government officials,
scholars, and communities.
The Meaning and Relevance of “Distributive Justice”
Distributive justice has been defined as “the right to equal
treatment, that is, to the same distribution of goods and opportunities as anyone else has or is given.”15 Aristotle is often credited with the first articulation of the concept and explained it as involving “the distribution of honour, wealth,
and the other divisible assets of the community, which may
12. Principles of Environmental Justice, First National People of Color
Environmental Leadership Summit (Oct. 27, 1991), reprinted in
Race and the Incidence of Environmental Hazards: A Time
for Discourse 215-17 (Bunyan Bryant & Paul Mohai eds., 1992),
and in Jim Schwab, Deeper Shades of Green 441-43 (1994). For
an extended analysis of the Principles of Environmental Justice, see
Taylor, supra note 1, at 537-45.
13. Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Justice for All, in Unequal Protection: Environmental Justice & Communities of Color 3,
10-11(Robert D. Bullard ed., 1996); Bullard, Leveling the Playing
Field Through Environmental Justice, supra note 4, at 454-57.
14. Id.; see also Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Justice for All: It’s
the Right Thing to Do, 9 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 281, 307 (1994).
15. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 273 (1977).
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be allotted among its members.”16 The focus of this aspect
of justice is on fairly distributed outcomes, rather than on the
process for arriving at such outcomes.
In an environmental context, distributive justice involves
the equitable distribution of the burdens resulting from environmentally threatening activities or of the environmental
benefits of government and private-sector programs. More
specifically, in an environmental justice context, distributive justice most commonly involves addressing the disproportionate public health and environmental risks borne by
people of color and lower incomes.17
Dr. Bullard labels this aspect of environmental justice
“geographic equity,” referring to the location and spatial
configuration of communities and their proximity to unwanted land uses.18 Although many distributive justice issues do involve the proximity of populations to threatening
land uses, issues of distribution are also impacted, for example, by nongeographic allegations that certain racial, ethnic,
or income groups are disproportionately exposed to occupational hazards.
The Executive Order on environmental justice focuses
predominantly on distributive justice concerns by directing
agencies to develop strategies for identifying and addressing disproportionately high and adverse human health and
environmental effects on minority and lower income populations.19 The Principles of Environmental Justice address
distributive justice when demanding that all peoples be free
from any form of discrimination and calling for universal
protection from, and the cessation of the production of,
harmful materials and wastes.20
Distributive justice concerns are also reflected in complaints under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 alleging that a recipient of federal financial assistance has unlawfully created, through an environmental program or decision, a “disproportionate burden” or “disparate impact” on a
racial class.21 Similarly, equal protection clause lawsuits alleging racial discrimination in landfill siting decisions have
all involved allegations of distributive injustice.22
16. Aristotle: The Nichomachean Ethics, Book V 267 (H.
Rackham trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1982). Relying on Aristotle’s definition of distributive justice, some philosophers argue
that “a political authority must define and particularize the scope or
criterion of any scheme of distribution.” Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal
Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 Yale L.J. 949,
989 (1988).
17. Kaswan, supra note 1, at 230-33.
18. Bullard, Overcoming Racism in Environmental Decisionmaking,
supra note 1, at 13; Bullard, Dumping in Dixie, supra note 1,
at 116.
19. Exec. Order 12898, supra note 6, §§1-101, 103(a).
20. Principles of Environmental Justice, supra note 12, at nos. 2, 4, 6.
21. See 42 U.S.C. §2000d (1994). This focus on disproportionate impacts or effects, rather than intent, is not unique to environmental
justice and is also present in government actions addressing childhood health risks. See Protection of Children From Environmental
Health Risks and Safety Risks, Exec. Order No. 13045, §1-101, 3
C.F.R. 198 (1997), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.A. §4321 (West Supp.
1999), Admin. Mat. 45088; Michael E. Mattheisen, The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s New Environmental Civil Rights
Policy, 19 Va. Envtl. L.J. 183, 192 n.45 (1999).
22. See R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1146 (E.D. Va. 1991), aff’d
without decision, 977 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1992); East Bibb Twiggs
Neighborhood Ass’n v. Macon-Bibb Planning & Zoning Comm’n,
706 F. Supp. 880 (M.D. Ga.), aff’d, 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1989);
Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673
(S.D. Tex. 1979), aff’d without decision, 782 F.2d 1038 (5th
Cir. 1986).
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Distributive justice in an environmental justice context
does not mean redistributing pollution or risk. Instead, environmental justice advocates argue that it means equal protection for all and the elimination of environmental hazards
and the need to place hazardous activities in any community.23 In other words, distributive justice is achieved
through a lowering of risks, not a shifting or equalizing of
existing risks.
With such a strong focus on the inequitable distribution
by race and income of environmental hazards, an often overlooked aspect of distributive justice is that it also involves
the distribution of the benefits of environmental programs
and policies, such as parks and beaches, public transportation, safe drinking water, and sewerage and drainage.24
Allegations of Distributive Injustice
At the international level, distributive justice concerns have
been raised, for example, by reports that a Taiwan plastics
company, unable to find a location in Taiwan to dispose of
its mercury wastes, shipped the hazardous waste to Cambodia, where it ended up in an open pit, killing a local worker
and threatening water supplies.25 Questions of distributive
justice are also raised by the actions of U.S. oil companies in
harming the natural resources of indigenous populations in
South America, and by the practice of shipping pesticides
banned for use in the United States to developing countries
and their less protected farmworkers.26 In a controversial
1991 memo, Lawrence Summers, now Secretary of the
Treasury in the Clinton Administration, argued that, regardless of distributive justice concerns, the World Bank should
encourage more exportation of waste to the least-developed
countries: “I think the economic logic behind dumping a
load of toxic waste in the lowest-wage country is impeccable and we should face up to that.”27
Although the first national environmental justice protest
occurred in 1982 over the planned disposal of
polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) wastes in Warren County,
North Carolina, widespread allegations of inequality in the
distribution of environmental risks emerged on the national
scene in 1987 with the release of a study by the United
Church of Christ. The study, “Toxic Wastes and Race in the
United States,” reviewed the demographic characteristics
around commercial hazardous waste facilities and found
that race was the most significant factor in predicting the
likelihood of living near such a facility—communities with
the greatest number of commercial hazardous waste facilities had the highest composition of racial and ethnic resi23. See, e.g., Bullard, Overcoming Racism in Environmental
Decisionmaking, supra note 1, at 43; Deeohn Ferris, A Challenge to
EPA: An Environmental Justice Office Is Needed, 18 EPA J.,
Mar./Apr. 1992, at 28.
24. See Michael Gelobter, The Meaning of Urban Environmental Justice, 21 Fordham Urb. L.J. 841, 844, 852-53 (1994).
25. What to Do With All That Waste?, Bus. Wk., Jan. 18, 1999, at 26.
26. See Marcia Coyle, Suits Test Environmental Jurisdiction, Nat’l
L.J., Feb. 8, 1999, at B1 (reporting on lawsuits alleging that Texaco
damaged the Oriente region of the Amazon rain forest and threatened the public health of indigenous tribes); Diana Jean Schemo,
U.S. Pesticide Kills Foreign Fruit Pickers’ Hopes, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 6, 1995, at A12 (reporting on allegations that the pesticide
DBCP, banned in the United States in 1977, was later exported to
Latin America, Africa, and the Philippines).
27. Let Them Eat Pollution, Economist, Feb. 8, 1992, at 66.
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dents.28 A 1994 update of the original study found that distributional inequities were increasing—the concentration
of people of color living around commercial hazardous
waste facilities had increased by almost 25% between 1980
and 1993.29
A persistent national distributive justice problem involves pesticides and farmworkers. Ninety percent of the
hired farmworkers in the United States are people of color,
an occupation that exposes them to significant amounts of
pesticides and leaves them unprotected by the Occupational
Safety and Health Act, the National Labor Relations Act,
and some provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act.30 Besides the obvious issue that, as farmworkers, people of color
receive less protection from the law and are disproportionately exposed to greater amounts of harmful pesticides, environmental justice advocates note that EPA has often taken
quick action to address possible threats to the general
public from consuming pesticide-tainted foods but has
been painfully slow to regulate pesticides that pose threats
to farmworkers.31
Native American tribes have complained that their lands
have been targeted for waste disposal facilities and disproportionately impacted by mining and nuclear weapons testing, resulting in harm to natural resources and public health
with little direct benefit to tribal members.32 Congress’ initial failure to authorize tribes to obtain environmental regulatory authority comparable to the states and the continuing
lack of adequate funding to address environmental problems on Indian lands also raise issues of distributive justice—the benefit of environmental protection programs has
not been fairly distributed to tribes and their members.33
28. Commission for Racial Justice, United Church of Christ,
Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States 13-14 (1987).
The United Church of Christ study confirmed an earlier study by the
U.S. General Accounting Office that found that African Americans
comprised the majority of the population around three of the four
hazardous waste landfills in the southeastern United States. U.S.
GAO, Siting of Hazardous Waste Landfills and Their
Correlation With the Racial and Socio-Economic Status
of the Surrounding Communities (1983).
29. Benjamin A. Goldman & Laura Fitton, Toxic Wastes and
Race Revisited 2-3 (1994). The report did not determine the cause
of the increase, which could be due, for example, to an influx of people of color into areas with waste facilities, “white flight” from such
areas, the closure of facilities in predominantly white areas, or the siting of new facilities in predominantly people of color neighborhoods.
30. Marion Moses et al., Environmental Equity and Pesticide Exposure,
9 Toxicology & Indus. Health 913 (1993); Marion Moses,
Farmworkers and Pesticides, in Confronting Environmental
Racism: Voices From the Grassroots 161 (Robert D. Bullard
ed., 1993); Ivette Perfecto & Baldemar Valasquez, Farm Workers:
Among the Least Protected, 18 EPA J., Mar./Apr. 1992, at 13.
31. See Robert D. Bullard, Conclusion: Environmentalism With Justice,
in Confronting Environmental Racism: Voices From the
Grassroots 195, 199 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1993) (comparing
EPA’s quick response to the Alar scare with its slow action to regulate Parathion).
32. See, e.g., Tom B.K. Goldtooth, Indigenous Nations: Summary of
Sovereignty and Its Implications for Environmental Protection, in
Environmental Justice: Issues, Policies, and Solutions 138,
143-45 (Bunyan Bryant ed., 1995) (summarizing disparate environmental impacts on indigenous lands); Joe Sanchez, The Western
Shoshone: Following Earth Mother’s Instructions, 3 Race, Poverty & Env’t, Fall 1992, at 10.
33. See Dean B. Suagee, The Indian Country Environmental Justice
Clinic: From Vision to Reality, 23 Vt. L. Rev. 567, 577, 581 (1999)
(noting that Congress enacted several environmental statutes and
EPA issued a host of regulations in the 1970s that either totally overlooked or barely mentioned tribes and that tribal environmental programs are underfunded and understaffed).

Three systematic reviews of available empirical evidence
concluded that studies overwhelmingly indicate that the distribution of pollution is inequitable by race and income,
with race the most strongly correlated indicator. Professors
Mohai and Bryant found that in 16 of 17 studies, the distribution of pollution was inequitable by race, and in 17 of 21,
inequitable by income; in 7 of the 10 cases where distribution was analyzed by both income and race, race was more
strongly related to the incidence of pollution than income.34
Benjamin Goldman reported that all but one of the 64 empirical studies of possible disparities found that people of color
and lower income groups face greater environmental impacts than other population groups, regardless of the kind of
environmental concern or the level of geographic specificity examined.35 Racial disparities were found more than income disparities, and when race and income were compared to see if either factor was more significantly related
to the environmental disparity, race proved to be more important in nearly three-quarters of the tests.36 Finally, an
unpublished 1995 Colorado State University review of 30
studies on the distribution of 46 different environmental
risks found that over 80% of the results showed race and
class disparities.37
Some researchers have questioned the methodology used
in some studies finding racial or class disparities,38 and a
34. Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant, Environmental Injustice: Weighing
Race and Class as Factors in the Distribution of Environmental
Hazards, 63 U. Colo. L. Rev. 921, 925-27 (1992); see also Paul
Mohai & Bunyan Bryant, Environmental Racism: Reviewing the Evidence, in Race and the Incidence of Environmental Hazards: A Time for Discourse 163, 165-69 (Bunyan Bryant & Paul
Mohai eds., 1992).
35. Benjamin A. Goldman, Not Just Prosperity: Achieving
Sustainability With Environmental Justice 8 (1994). The 64
studies examined proximity to industrial facilities, human exposure
to toxic substances, ambient concentrations of air pollutants, regulatory costs and benefits, and health effects. Id. at 4. The level of geographic specificity analyzed included national, metropolitan statistical areas, counties, cities, ZIP codes, and census tracts. Id.
Professor Vicki Been also has documented the results of a number
of studies of distributional inequities. Vicki Been, Environmental
Justice and Equity Issues, in 4 Zoning and Land Use Controls
25D-10 to 27 (Patrick J. Rohan ed., 1995).
36. Goldman, supra note 35, at 8.
37. See Evan J. Ringquist, Environmental Justice: Normative Concerns
and Empirical Evidence, in Environmental Policy: New Directions for the Twenty-First Century 232, 241 & n.32 (Norman
J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds., 2000) (reporting the results of a paper
presented by David Allen, James Lester, and Kelly Hill, “Prejudice,
Profits, and Power: Assessing the Eco-Racism Thesis at the County
Level,” at the annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Portland, Oregon, 1995).
Other reviews have found racial and income disparities in environmental exposures. After examining the available scientific literature and information obtained from site visits, the National Research
Council’s Committee on Environmental Justice concluded that minority and low-income communities “experience higher levels of
exposure to environmental stressors in terms of both frequency and
magnitude.” Committee on Environmental Justice, Institute
of Medicine, Toward Environmental Justice 6 (1999). EPA
similarly concluded in its 1992 report on environmental equity: “Racial minority and low-income populations experience higher than
average exposures to selected air pollutants, hazardous waste facilities, contaminated fish, and agricultural pesticides in the workplace.” U.S. EPA, Reducing Risk for All Communities supra
note 2, at 3.
38. See, e.g., Thomas Lambert et al., A Critique of “Environmental Justice” 4-6 (1996); Rae Zimmerman, Issues of Classification
in Environmental Equity: How We Manage Is How We Measure, 21
Fordham Urb. L.J. 633 (1994); John J. Fahsbender, An Analytical
Approach to Defining the Affected Neighborhood in the Environmental Justice Context, N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 120 (1996).
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few recent individual studies have not found evidence of
distributive inequities. A 1994 University of Massachusetts
study, for example, found no significant differences between the racial or ethnic compositions of areas around
commercial hazardous waste facilities and those areas that
do not contain such facilities.39 However, when similar
comparison populations are used, the University of Massachusetts study yields results that support the conclusions of
the United Church of Christ study.40
A 1995 U.S. General Accounting Office study found
that minorities and low-income people were not
overrepresented near a majority of nonhazardous municipal landfills; its review of 10 existing studies on hazardous waste facilities found varied results on whether minorities or lower income persons were overrepresented
near such facilities.41
Professor Vicki Been’s research revealed that although
the percentage of African Americans or Hispanics in a census tract is a significant predictor of whether or not the tract
hosts a commercial hazardous waste facility, it provides no
significant evidence as to African Americans, but does as
to Hispanics, that the percentage of minorities in the census tract affected the probability that the area would be
chosen to host a facility.42 While Been’s findings do not negate claims of present distributional inequities, they do
raise questions about the causes of, and possible solutions
to, racial disparities in the proximity of populations to
waste facilities.
Some of the best known local environmental justice disputes
have involved dramatic evidence of distributive inequities.
In Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v.
Seif,43 residents of Chester, Pennsylvania, alleged that the
39. Douglas L. Anderton et al., Environmental Equity: The Demographics of Dumping, 31 Demography 229, 243-44 (1994). A later study
by other researchers at the University of Massachusetts using 29
measures of environmental quality found just the opposite: “Race
and ethnicity are strongly associated with a lack of environmental
quality.” John A. Hird & Michael Reese, The Distribution of Environmental Quality: An Empirical Analysis, 79 Soc. Sci. Q. 694,
694 (1998).
40. Hird & Reese, supra note 39, at 711; Paul Mohai, The Demographics
of Dumping Revisited: Examining the Impact of Alternate Methodologies in Environmental Justice Research, 14 Va. Envtl. L.J. 615,
617-28; Fahsbender, supra note 38, at 165.
41. U.S. GAO, Hazardous and Nonhazardous Waste: Demographics of People Living Near Waste Facilities 4 (1995). For
a discussion of conflicting study results, see John E. Milner &
John Turner, Environmental Justice, 13 Nat. Resources & Env’t
478 (1999).
42. Vicki Been & Francis Gupta, Coming to the Nuisance or Going to
the Barrios? A Longitudinal Analysis of Environmental Justice
Claims, 24 Ecology L.Q. 1, 33 (1997). Been’s research did show
that the percentage of Hispanics at the beginning of a decade increased the probability that the tract would be selected to host a facility in that decade. Id. A 1995 study of St. Louis area housing found
that poor and minority residents moved into low-cost housing after
polluting facilities were already built. See Christopher Boerner &
Thomas Lambert, Environmental Justice in the City of St.
Louis: The Economics of Siting Industrial and Waste Facilities (Center for the Study of American Business Working Paper
No. 156, 1995).
43. 132 F.3d 925, 28 ELR 20487 (3d Cir. 1997), vacated, 524 U.S. 974
(1998). Although the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in the
case to decide whether or not a private cause of action exists under
EPA’s Title VI regulations, the Court vacated the case as moot when
the company withdrew its permit application. Since the Supreme
Court’s action on the Chester appeal, the Third and Eleventh Circuits have recognized, although not in environmental justice cases, a
private cause of action under Title VI for violations of a federal
agency’s disparate impact regulations. See Powell v. Ridge, 189
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state’s issuance of a permit for a new waste facility would
create an unlawful disparate impact on African-American
residents. As evidence, they noted that Chester, with a population of 42,000, 65% of which are African American, had
become the designated dumping grounds for the rest of Delaware County, with a population of 502,000, 91% of which
are white.44 Though one-twelfth the size of the county,
Chester already has five permitted waste facilities, while the
rest of Delaware County has only two. All of Delaware
County’s municipal waste and sewage is processed in Chester, although only 7.5% of the county’s population resides in
the town.45 Most dramatically, the permitted capacity for the
waste facilities in the much smaller city of Chester are 1,500
times greater than the permitted capacity for the remaining
facilities in Delaware County (2.1 million tons vs. 1,400
tons), and the capacity per person for the waste facilities in
the 65% African-American Chester area is almost 18,000
times greater than the capacity per person for the facilities in
91% white Delaware County.
The dispute over a proposal by Shintech to build a new
polyvinyl chloride (PVC) plant in the lower income, 84%
African-American community of Convent, Louisiana, also
raised substantial distributive justice concerns. An analysis
of toxic air emissions from the 10 existing petrochemical
plants in the Convent area revealed that residents were already exposed to 251,179 pounds of toxic air pollution per
square mile per year, and Shintech proposed to emit an additional three million pounds of air pollution per year, over
600,000 pounds of which would be toxic.46 This existing cumulative impact on the 84% African-American Convent-area residents is 67 times greater than the toxic air pollution burden for the rest of St. James Parish (the third most
polluted parish in the state and 43.5% African American),
93 times greater than the average toxic air pollution exposure per square mile for the heavily polluted Louisiana Mississippi River industrial corridor (36.8% African American), 129 times greater than Louisiana’s average exposure
per square mile (the second most polluted state in the nation
and 30.8% African American), and 658 times higher than
the average toxic air pollution exposure per square mile in
the United States (12% African American). EPA’s disparate
impact analysis, using its “relative emissions burden ratio”
method, found that, were Shintech permitted to operate, African Americans in St. James Parish would experience a
F.3d 387, 397-400 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 579 (1999);
Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484, 501-07 (11th Cir. 1999); but see
New York City Envtl. Justice Alliance v. Giuliani, 50 F. Supp. 2d
250, 253-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding it is unlikely a private right of
action is available under EPA’s Title VI regulations), aff’d on other
grounds, No. 99-7713, 2000 WL 694152 (2d Cir. May 31, 2000).
44. 132 F.3d at 927 n.1, 28 ELR at 20488 n.1.
45. Mark Jaffe, Minority Areas Gain in Suit on Waste Sites, Phil. Inquirer, Jan. 1, 1998, at A1.
46. Analysis based on 1995 U.S. EPA toxics release inventory data for
the 50-square-mile area displayed in map, “Convent Area School
and Toxic Release Inventory Sites With 1995 Total Air Emissions
(1998),” prepared by Charles A. Flanagan. See From Plantations
to Plants: Report of the Emergency National Commission
on Environmental and Economic Justice in St. James Parish, Louisiana 7, 9 (1998) (includes Flanagan map); Public Notice,
Louisiana Dep’t of Environmental Quality, Air Quality Division,
Request for Public Comment and Notification of a Public Hearing
on a Proposed Air Pollution Source, St. James Chemical Production
Complex, Shintech Inc. and Its Affiliates, Convent, St. James Parish,
Louisiana, Advocate (Baton Rouge, La), Nov. 7, 1996, at 10C
(projected air pollution emissions for Shintech facility).
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71% to 242% greater toxic air pollution burden than
non-African Americans in the parish.47
The proposal to develop a uranium enrichment facility
in the poor, 97% African-American communities of Center Springs and Forest Grove in Claiborne Parish, Louisiana, also triggered allegations that low-income and minority communities were being asked to assume disproportionate environmental risks. In testimony before the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, an expert witness demonstrated that at each progressively more selective stage
in the uranium company’s site selection process, the level
of poverty and African Americans in a one-mile radius
around possible sites rose dramatically—from 28% African American during the initial review of 78 sites, to 37%
African American when the sites were narrowed to 37, to
65% when the focus was narrowed to 6 sites in Claiborne
Parish, until finally settling on the proposed site with a
97% African-American population.48 This testimony also
revealed how institutionalized racism and the subconscious biases of those involved in the site selection process result in the selection and application of siting criterion that create the disproportionate siting of environmentally risky operations in lower income and African-American communities.49
A somewhat different twist on allegations of distributive injustice is presented by the air pollution trading
strategy developed by California’s South Coast Air Quality Management District. The District’s program creates
“smog markets” that allow Los Angeles-area industries to
buy and scrap old, high-polluting automobiles driven by
area residents and, in return, get credits that allow the industries to avoid reducing air pollution at their facilities.50 Environmental justice advocates complained that,
although such trades may lead to improved air quality
over the entire air quality region, they shift air pollution
to and create “hot spots” in the communities around the
facilities, which are disproportionately lower income
and minority. 51
The adverse impacts encompassed by complaints of distributive inequities need not involve only threats from pollution or the loss of natural resources. Noise, odors, blowing
trash, aesthetic concerns, increased traffic, termites, decreased property values and uses, fires, accidents, psycho47. U.S. EPA, Title VI Administrative Complaint Re: Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality Permit for Proposed Shintech Facility: Summary Documentation of Draft
Revised Demographic Analysis, Table C5 (Apr. 1998).
48. In re Louisiana Energy Servs., L.P. (Claiborne Enrichment Center),
45 N.R.C. 367, 386 (1997), 1997 WL 458771 (N.R.C.), 1997 NRC
LEXIS 20 (Atomic Safety and Licensing Board May 1, 1997), aff’d
in part & rev’d in part, 47 N.R.C. 77 (1998), 1998 WL 191132
(N.R.C.), 1998 NRC LEXIS 7 (Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Apr. 3, 1998).
49. Id., 45 N.R.C. at 385-89. See also Bullard, Leveling the Playing
Field Through Environmental Justice, supra note 4, at 473-76.
50. See Marla Cone, Civil Rights Suit Attacks Trade in Pollution
Credits, L.A. Times, July 23, 1997, at A1; see also Scott Kuhn, Expanding Public Participation Is Essential to Environmental Justice
and the Democratic Decisionmaking Process, 25 Ecology L.Q.
647, 650-53 (1999).
51. Under a new EPA draft guidance, states must ensure that communities populated by minorities or people with low incomes are not disproportionately impacted by economic incentive programs. Office
of Air & Radiation, U.S. EPA, Draft Economic Incentive
Program Guidance 47-51 (Sept. 1999).

logical harm, and other nuisance or quality-of-life impacts
also may support a claim of distributive injustice.52
Finally, local environmental justice struggles have involved allegations that people of color and lower income
communities have not received their fair share of public
health services and other environmental amenities. Although not labeled at the time as an environmental justice
case, African-American residents successfully sued a
Florida town under the Equal Protection Clause in Dowdell
v. Apopka53 to obtain equal municipal services such as park
and recreational facilities, sewerage and stormwater drainage, a water distribution system, and paving and maintenance of streets. The disparity of environmental amenities
between white, well-to-do neighborhoods and those where people of color and lower incomes live is also evidenced by New
York City’s actions some years ago in creating 225 neighborhood parks, with only 2 in African-American communities.54
More recently, environmental justice advocates in Atlanta and Los Angeles alleged that transportation planning
and spending was disparately impacting low-income and
minority populations by, among other things, failing to address the transportation needs of inner-city residents and by
favoring suburban residents.55 In Atlanta, these allegations
resulted in a significant shift in transportation spending toward older neighborhoods, which will now obtain not only
improved public transportation, but also upgraded sidewalks,
trees, and lighting.56 Given the significant environmental and
social impacts as well as the large amounts of money involved in road projects, distributive justice issues are likely to
arise more frequently in proposed transportation projects.57
52. See, e.g., North Baton Rouge Envtl. Ass’n et al., Complaint Under
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, No. 10R-97-R9 (June 8, 1998) (alleging broad range of nuisance and quality of life impacts from proposed landfill in Alsen, Louisiana); see also Office of Civil
Rights, U.S. EPA, Draft Revised Guidance for Investigating Title VI Administrative Complaints Challenging
Permits §VI.B.2.a & app. A (June 2000) (adverse impacts, or
“stressors,” may include physical factors such as noise and odors),
reprinted in 65 Fed. Reg. 39649 (June 27, 2000) (available from the
ELR Document Service, ELR Order No. AD-4516) [hereinafter
Draft Revised Title VI Guidance].
53. 511 F. Supp. 1375 (M.D. Fla. 1981), aff’d in part & rev’d in part on
other grounds, 698 F.2d 1181 (11th Cir. 1983); see also Johnson v.
Arcadia, 450 F. Supp. 1363 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (inequality of services
and facilities to black residents with respect to street paving, parks
and recreation, and water supply system violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights). Similarly, a recent Title VI administrative complaint
filed with EPA against the city of Indianapolis alleges that city officials have disproportionately spent more money for improvements
to sewer systems in neighborhoods with low percentages of minority
residents and neglected the needs of areas with larger minority populations. Indiana Environmental Justice Case Provides EPA With
“Easy Win,” Inside EPA, Oct. 29, 1999, at 23.
54. Gelobter, supra note 24, at 853 (citing Robert A. Caro, The
Power Broker 510 (1974)); see also Vernice D. Miller, Planning,
Power and Politics: A Case Study of the Land Use and Siting History
of the North River Water Pollution Control Plant, 21 Fordham
Urb. L.J. 707, 714 (1994).
55. See Mark Murray, Seeking Justice in Roads and Runways, 32 Nat’l
J., Mar. 4, 2000, at 712.
56. David Goldberg, Transit Priorities Shifting: No New Road Money in
Plan, Atlanta J., June 24, 1999, at C1.
57. See Agencies Advocate Rights Reviews in Transportation Planning
Processes, 30 Env’t Rep. (BNA) at 1376 (Nov. 26, 1999); Title VI Issues Seen Increasing in Transportation Projects, Plans, Daily Env’t
Rep. (BNA), Feb. 4, 2000, at A-10; see also 65 Fed. Reg. 33921
(May 25, 2000) (proposed revisions to regulations governing the development of metropolitan and statewide transportation plans and
programs; includes regulatory language to implement Executive Order No. 12898).
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Implications of Distributive Injustice

The Meaning and Relevance of “Procedural Justice”

Dramatic as these instances of disparity are, they do not provide a standard for determining when a disparate impact is
inequitable. To date, there is no consensus as to what constitutes a “minority” or “low-income” community, the appropriate boundary of the “affected community,” or the appropriate “reference community.”58 Furthermore, there is no
agreed methodology or standard for determining the degree
of disparity that might be legally significant under Title VI,
and the issue of what would constitute an “adverse” impact,
while addressed in the circumstances of EPA’s decision in
St. Francis Prayer Center v. Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (Select Steel)59 case, remains controversial. Even were agreement reached on the methodological
issues and a legally actionable disparate impact found, there
is no consensus on what would be a fair way to address the
inequities, with proposals ranging from doing nothing, to
ensuring compensation for affected communities, to banning activities that will add to the disparity.60
The inability to articulate standards for resolving allegations of distributive injustice does not make the claims of affected communities any less legitimate or the evidence of
distributive inequities any less disturbing. It does mean,
however, that until legislatures, agencies, or courts confront
these political and legal issues, instances of distributive injustice are likely to go unresolved.

Procedural justice has been defined as “the right to treatment as an equal. That is the right, not to an equal distribution of some good or opportunity, but to equal concern and
respect in the political decision about how these goods and
opportunities are to be distributed.”62 Aristotle referred to
this as a status in which individuals have an “equal share in
ruling and being ruled.”63 It involves justice as a function of
the manner in which a decision is made, and it requires a focus on the fairness of the decisionmaking process, rather
than on its outcome.
Dr. Bullard terms this aspect of environmental justice
“procedural equity”—the need for democratic decisions—which encompasses inclusiveness, representation,
parity, and communication.64 Professor Kaswan refers to it
as “political justice,” reflecting her belief that achieving
environmental justice will require changing the political
dynamic so that all groups are treated fairly in decisionmaking processes.65
The Executive Order on environmental justice has a
strong focus on procedural justice, directing agencies to ensure greater public participation and access to information
for minority and low-income populations.66 The Principles
of Environmental Justice demand that public policy be
based on mutual respect and justice for all peoples and free
from bias or discrimination, affirm the fundamental right to
self-determination, and insist on the right to participate as
equal partners at every level of decisionmaking.67
Environmental justice complaints raise both ex ante and
ex post considerations of procedural fairness.68 Looking at
the process in advance of its use (ex ante), they question
whether the decisionmaking and public participation procedures are fair to all concerned or whether they favor one side
over the other. Also, looking back (ex post), the complaints
question whether the completed decisionmaking process
did, in fact, treat all with equal concern and respect.
One way to judge procedural justice ex ante is to determine if those to be affected by the decision agree in advance
on the process for making the decision. Thus, procedural
justice requires looking not just to participation in a
process but to whether the process is designed in a way to
lead to a fair outcome.69 In this respect, environmental
decisionmaking processes have been roundly criticized by
commentators who have examined issues of environmental
justice and public participation. One common observation is

Environmental Justice as Procedural Justice
Claims of procedural injustice also are common in environmental justice disputes, and it is not usual for people of color
and low-income communities to complain about both the
distributive and procedural aspects of an environmental policy or decision. Indeed, in many situations, a community’s
judgment about whether or not an outcome was distributively just will be significantly determined by the perceived
fairness of the procedures leading to the outcome.61
58. For a discussion of proposed methodologies to address these issues,
see Draft Revised Title VI Guidance, supra note 52, §VI.5;
U.S. EPA & Science Advisory Board, An SAB Report: Review of Disproportionate Impact Methodologies (Dec.
1998); Region 2 Environmental Justice Work Group, U.S.
EPA, Implementation Guidance to the U.S. EPA Region 2
Draft Interim Policy on Identifying EJ Areas—Part II
(June 1999).
59. See Draft Revised Title VI Guidance, supra note 52, §VI.B.6
(“for both demographic disparity and disparity of impact, there is no
fixed formula or analysis to be applied”); Title VI Implementation Advisory Committee, U.S. EPA, Report of the Title VI
Implementation Advisory Committee 6-7 (Mar. 1, 1999) (committee disagrees about whether a facility’s compliance with existing
regulatory requirements should defeat a Title VI claim and about the
degree of disparity needed to support a Title VI complaint); Letter
from Ann E. Goode, Director, Office of Civil Rights, U.S. EPA, to
Father Phil Schmitter, Co-Director, St. Francis Prayer Center, et al.
(Oct. 30, 1998) (Select Steel decision letter holds that, because emissions from the proposed facility are within EPA’s presumptively
safe health-based standards, no adverse effect would result from the
permitted facility).
60. See Vicki Been, What’s Fairness Got to Do With It? Environmental
Justice and the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 Cornell L. Rev. 1001, 1027-68 (1993); Seth D. Jaffe, The Market’s Response to Environmental Inequity: We Have the Solution; What’s the
Problem?, 14 Va. Envtl. L.J. 655, 656 (1995).
61. Jeffrey Rachlinski, Perceptions of Fairness in Environmental Regulation, in Strategies for Environmental Enforcement 339,
347 (Barton H. Thompson Jr. ed., 1995).

62. Dworkin, supra note 15, at 273.
63. Steven J. Heyman, Aristotle on Political Justice, 77 Iowa L. Rev.
851, 863 (1992); see also Aristotle, Politics III.13 (Carnes Lorde
trans., 1984).
64. Bullard, Dumping in Dixie, supra note 1, at 116; U.S. EPA,
Guidance for Incorporating Environmental Justice Concerns in EPA’s NEPA Compliance Analysis 42-43 (1998) (explaining the characteristics of Dr. Bullard’s public involvement
strategies) (available from the ELR Document Service, ELR Order
No. AD-3856); Bullard, Overcoming Racism in Environmental
Decisionmaking, supra note 1, at 12.
65. Kaswan, supra note 1, at 224.
66. Exec. Order No. 12898, supra note 6, §§1-103(a), 5-5.
67. Principles of Environmental Justice, supra note 12, at nos. 2, 5, 7.
68. See generally Bruce L. Hay, Procedural Justice—Ex Ante vs. Ex
Post, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1803 (1997).
69. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 85-86 (1971).
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that the predominant expertise-oriented, interest-group
model of environmental decisionmaking favors those with
resources and political power over people of color and
low-income communities.70 Even the civil republican process, which outwardly seeks to advance community interests over private interests, may obscure the true private interests at issue and the continuing disparities in resources,
power, and influence.71 In general, to achieve procedural
justice, observers advocate developing more deliberative
models of decisionmaking, providing disadvantaged
groups with greater legal and technical resources, and ensuring equal access to decisionmakers and the decisionmaking process.72
Environmental justice communities also commonly complain about the implementation of the process (i.e., the ex
post aspect) as set forth in the allegations of procedural injustice described below.
Allegations of Procedural Injustice
Internationally, the American Anthropological Association
has chronicled an array of procedural abuses in the International Financing Corporation’s funding of a dam project in
an area populated by the Pehuenche, an indigenous group in
Chile.73 These abuses involved failing to identify the Pehuenche as among those affected by the project, failing to provide
opportunities for the Pehuenche’s participation in
decisionmaking, negotiating impact agreements without the
awareness or involvement of the native peoples, manipulating language on project impacts, and withholding a report on
potential damage from the dam.74 Secrecy and lack of public
participation also are typical of the circumstances surrounding the export of toxic wastes to developing countries.75
70. See, e.g., Denis J. Brion, An Essay on LULU, NIMBY, and the Problem of Distributive Justice, 15 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 437,
441-47 (1988); Sheila Foster, Justice From the Ground Up: Distributive Inequities, Grassroots Resistance, and the Transformative
Politics of the Environmental Justice Movement, 86 Cal. L. Rev.
775, 801-02, 832-33 (1998); Eileen Gauna, The Environmental Justice Misfit: Public Participation and the Paradigm Paradox, 17
Stan. Envtl. L.J. 3, 31-47 (1998); R. Gregory Roberts, Environmental Justice and Community Empowerment: Learning From the
Civil Rights Movement, 48 Am. U. L. Rev. 229, 253-54 (1998).
71. Gauna, supra note 70, at 49-50.
72. See, e.g., Office of Civil Rights, U.S. EPA, Draft Title VI
Guidance for EPA Assistance Recipients Administering
Environmental Permitting Programs §II.B.2 (June 2000), reprinted in 65 Fed. Reg. 39649 (June 27, 2000) (available from the
ELR Document Service, ELR Order No. AD-4517); National Environmental Justice Advisory Council, U.S. EPA, The
Model Plan for Public Participation 2-5 (Nov. 1996); Nicholas A. Ashford & Kathleen M. Rest, Public Participation in
Contaminated Communities VII-5 to 19 (1999); John Applegate,
Beyond the Usual Suspects: The Use of Citizen Advisory Boards in
Environmental Decisionmaking, 73 Ind. L.J. 903, 952-56 (1998);
Foster, supra note 70, at 833-37; Gauna, supra note 70, at 51-71.
73. See Jeffrey B. Gracer, Protecting Citizens of Other Countries, in
The Law of Environmental Justice 718, 726 (Michael B.
Gerrard ed., 1999); Committee for Human Rights, American Anthropological Ass’n, The Pehuenche, the World Bank Group and
ENDES S.A. (visited Apr. 19, 2000) <http://www.aaanet.org/committees/cfhr/rptpehuenc.htm>.
74. Committee for Human Rights, supra note 73.
75. See, e.g., Mutombo Mpanya, The Dumping of Toxic Waste in African Countries: A Case of Poverty and Racism, in Race and the Incidence of Environmental Hazards: A Time for Discourse
204 (Bunyan Bryant & Paul Mohai eds., 1992); Ibrahim J. Wani,
Poverty, Governance, the Rule of Law, and International Environmentalism, 1 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 37 (1991).

A common procedural justice complaint at the national
level is that people of color and lower income communities
have had little influence on the decisionmaking processes of
legislatures and environmental agencies. “[Racial minorities] have not been well represented among the interest
groups lobbying and litigating before government authorities on environmental protection issues. Nor have they been
well represented, especially at the national level, within
those governmental organizations actively involved in the
relevant environmental process.”76 Thus, while overexposed to environmental risks, people of color and lower income communities are underrepresented in environmental
policymaking agencies and commissions, have fewer technical, legal, and other resources to participate effectively in
decisionmaking processes, and are able to exert less political influence over the officials that make environmental decisions.77 Even where citizens are able to participate, environmental decisionmakers are skeptical of the validity of
citizen information and are biased in favor of the scientific
data submitted by regulated industries.78
Underrepresentation on the technical or scientific boards
and commissions that make environmental decisions and
recommendations is also a problem, particularly since the
actions of these boards often reflect politics and personal
values.79 For example, the 48-member EPA Science Advisory Board (SAB) committee that issued the influential report comparing the relative risks of various environmental
hazards and helped set the Agency’s regulatory agenda contained only one representative of community and environmental groups, much less a representative of the interests of
lower income or people of color populations.80 There also
has only been token representation of workers on committees that recommend workplace exposure standards and of
affected communities on other EPA advisory committees.81
Another procedural justice aspect is the manner in which
the government collects and analyzes data on environmen76. Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing “Environmental Justice” The Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev.
787, 819-20 (1992).
77. See Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant, Race, Poverty, and the Environment, 19 EPA J., Mar./Apr. 1992, at 6, 7.
78. Ann Bray, Scientific Decision Making: A Barrier to Citizen Participation in Environmental Agency Decision Making, 17 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1111, 1128 (1991) (reporting results of a survey of environmental agency staff). The institutional bias of environmental
agencies is revealed by the finding that, while skeptical about the accuracy of citizen information, “[a]gency staff were more likely to
view industry data as accurate despite the inadequacy of agency resources to test the data.” Id.
79. See Robert R. Kuehn, The Environmental Justice Implications of
Quantitative Risk Assessment, 1996 U. Ill. L. Rev. 103, 165 (noting that agency scientific committees “issue recommendations that
go far beyond objective science and enter the realms of politics and
values. The scientific review process that the boards undertake,
however, ‘appears not to be the objective, dispassionate process that
its advocates represent it to be.’”).
80. Mary O’Brien, A Proposal to Address, Rather Than Rank, Environmental Problems, in Worst Things First? 87, 91-92 (Adam M.
Finkel & Dominic Golding eds., 1994). One public interest scientist
observed that, had the committee been more representative of those
exposed to the hazards, it would have ranked relative environmental
risks differently. Id. at 91-92.
81. See Barry I. Castleman & Grace E. Ziem, Corporate Influence on
Threshold Limit Values, 13 Am. J. Indus. Med. 531, 554 (1988)
(noting the lack of workers on occupational safety and health committees); Gauna, supra note 70, at 60 (noting the failure of EPA’s
New Source Review Subcommittee to include any representative
from impacted communities).

30 ELR 10690

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER

Copyright © 2000 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. reprinted with permission from ELR®—The Environmental Law Reporter®. All rights reserved.

9-2000

tal exposures and public health. In one case, EPA and the
National Institutes of Health announced a $15 million,
10-year epidemiological study on the health of farmers and
farmworkers that would omit Hispanics from the study,
even though farmworkers are largely Hispanic.82 The justification for the omission? The difficulty of tracking the
highly mobile Hispanic population.83
In addition, commentators have questioned whether the
use of risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis in environmental decisionmaking may prejudice peoples of color and
lower income populations.84 They point out, among other
concerns, that these analytical methods may fail to recognize and protect susceptible subpopulations, squeeze out
consideration of nonquantitative information, undervalue
those without money, and exclude disadvantaged groups
from the decisionmaking process.85
The continuing failure of EPA to investigate and resolve
Title VI complaints raises concerns about the Agency’s
commitment to treating all with equal concern and respect.
Although mandated to render a decision within 180 days of
accepting a Title VI complaint for investigation,86 EPA’s Office of Civil Rights has issued only 1 decision on the merits,
and has a backlog of over 40 Title VI complaints, some
pending since 1993.87 In contrast, under pressure from the
state of Michigan and business interests, EPA issued a decision (its only decision on the merits) denying the Title VI
complaint in the Select Steel case within 90 days of accepting the complaint for investigation.88 Congress likewise has
shown little concern for fair treatment of those alleging environmental discrimination, having twice inserted riders in
EPA’s appropriations that prohibit the Agency from implementing its Title VI interim guidance with respect to complaints filed after October 21, 1998.89
In addition to concerns about the swiftness with which
EPA decided the Select Steel case, EPA’s Office of Civil
Rights has been criticized for the manner in which it made

its decision. A coalition of Title VI complainants alleged
that, in addition to factual and legal errors in the decision,
EPA did not comply with the steps outlined in its own guidance for investigating Title VI administrative complaints,
did not follow its own guidance on cumulative impacts,
ignored the recommendation of EPA’s SAB, relied on incorrect information from the target of the investigation,
and denied complainants the opportunity to review and
rebut the state’s information, thereby raising questions
about the Agency’s credibility and “the due process accorded the complainants.”90
The breadth of national procedural justice concerns is
reflected in a 1990 letter from environmental justice
groups to the 10 largest national nonprofit environmental
organizations. The community groups complained that the
national environmental organizations had failed to hire
sufficient numbers of people of color and requested that
the organizations take immediate steps to diversify their
staffs and boards.91
Native Americans often raise procedural justice issues
arising from their treaty rights, cultural and religious beliefs,
or unique sovereign status. The Mattaponi Tribe filed a lawsuit and Title VI complaint against state agencies that approved the construction of the King William Reservoir in
Virginia. The tribe alleged that during the permit application
process the agencies were willing to consider non-Indian
fishing, recreational, wetland, forest, and agricultural interests but refused to consider tribal treaty rights and cultural
values.92 The Assiniboine and Gros Ventre Tribes successfully challenged the failure of the Bureau of Land Management to consider and protect tribal resources from the adverse impacts of off-reservation mining activities.93 A number of tribes have objected to the failure of government officials and private developers to respect and protect places
that have religious and cultural importance for Indian
tribes,94 and President Clinton issued an executive order in

82. NIH Omits Hispanics in Farmworker Study, 18 COSSMHO Rep.,
Apr. 1993 - Oct. 1993, at 1 (a publication of the National Coalition of
Hispanic Health & Human Services Organizations).
83. Id. When an Hispanic organization complained, the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences stated that another study was
being planned that would later focus on Hispanic farmworkers. Id.
84. See, e.g., Carl F. Cranor, Risk Assessment, Susceptible
Subpopulations, and Environmental Justice, in The Law of Environmental Justice 307 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 1999); Lisa
Heinzerling, The Rights of Statistical People, 24 Harv. Envtl. L.
Rev. 189 (2000); Kuehn, supra note 79; Thomas O. McGarity, A
Cost-Benefit State, 50 Admin. L. Rev. 7 (1998).
85. See Cranor, supra note 84, at 326-33; Heinzerling, supra note 84, at
192-95; Kuehn, supra note 79, at 116-49; McGarity, supra note 84,
at 50-74.
86. 40 C.F.R. §7.115(c)(1) (1999).
87. Office of Civil Rights, U.S. EPA, Status Summary Table of EPA
Title VI Administrative Complaints (04/17/00) (visited May 26, 2000)
<http.www.epa.gov/civilrights/docs/t6stapr2000.pdf>; Office of
Civil Rights, U.S. EPA, Title VI Complaints Filed with EPA (visited
May 26, 2000) <http.www.epa.gov/civilrights/doc/t6csapr2000.pdf>.
88. See Luke W. Cole, “Wrong on the Facts, Wrong on the Law”: Civil
Rights Advocates Excoriate EPA’s Most Recent Title VI Misstep, 29
ELR 10775, 10776 (Dec. 1999).
89. See Appropriations for Departments of Veterans Affairs and
Housing and Urban Development and for Sundry Independent
Agencies for Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-74 (H.R. 2684), 113 Stat. 1047, 106th Cong. tit. III (1999); Appropriations for Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and
Urban Development and for Sundry Independent Agencies for Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-276 (H.R.
4194), 112 Stat. 2461, 105th Cong. tit. III (1998).

90. Joint Petition to Re-Open Select Steel Investigation, or, in the Alternative, to Set Aside Investigative and Analytical Methods, EPA No.
5R-98-R5, at 27-31 (Mar. 1, 1999) (on file with author). EPA denied
the joint petition without providing a formal response to the allegations. Cole, supra note 88, at 10780 & n.48 (citing letter from Ann E.
Goode, Director, Office of Civil Rights, EPA, to Luke W. Cole et al.
(July 29, 1999)).
91. See Claudia MacLachlan, Tension Underlies Rapport With Grassroots Groups, Nat’l L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S10.
92. See Petition for Appeal, Mattaponi Indian Tribe v. Virginia Dep’t of
Envtl. Quality, No. 30001-RW (Newport News Va. Cir. Ct. 1998)
(on file with author); Letter from Hope M. Babcock & Jeffrey C.
Nelson, Institute for Public Representation, Georgetown University
Law Center, to Ann E. Goode, Director, Office of Civil Rights, EPA
(June 16, 1998) (on file with author). The trial court dismissed the
lawsuit for lack of standing, and this decision was affirmed on appeal. Mattapoini Indian Tribe v. Virginia, 524 S.E.2d 167 (Va. App.
Ct. 2000).
93. Indian Mountain Protectors, 144 I.B.L.A. 168, 183-85 (Interior Bd.
Land Appeals 1998) (holding that the Bureau of Land Management’s (BLM’s) trust obligation to a tribe extends to actions BLM
takes off-reservation that uniquely impact tribal members or property on a reservation).
94. See, e.g., Gwyn Mellinger, Suit Centers on Religious Practices,
Lawrence J.-World (Lawrence, Kan.), Mar. 28, 1997 (reporting
on objections to the construction of the South Lawrence Trafficway
in Lawrence, Kansas, through sacred grounds on the Haskell Indian
Nations University campus); James Brooke, Highway Plans a Monument to Suburban Sprawl, Chi. Trib., May 17, 1998, at 1 (reporting
on opposition to the construction of a six-lane highway through the
Petroglyph National Monument outside Albuquerque, New Mexico). A plaintiff in the lawsuit to stop the South Lawrence Trafficway
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1996 requiring federal agencies to accommodate tribal access to sacred sites and to avoid adverse impacts on the
physical integrity of the sites.95 The widely publicized attempts to site waste facilities on Native American lands
also raise procedural justice concerns, including the issue
of the right of sovereign tribes to make their own decisions as to the use of their lands and to have those decisions respected by government agencies and environmental organizations.96
The Shintech case again dramatically illustrates the extent of local procedural justice issues. As is common in environmental justice disputes, local residents opposing the petrochemical plant complained about the lack of sufficient pubic notice, inconvenient times and places for public hearings, exclusion from agency meetings, and inaccessibility of
important documents.97 Additional procedural justice problems arose from the governor of Louisiana’s position that
equal treatment of all persons was not the goal of the air permitting process: “The [Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality’s] job is to go out and make it as easy as they
can [for Shintech] within the law.”98 These efforts by the
state involved not only approving a 34-page, single-spaced
remarked: “All we ask is the same kind of respect . . . that our ancestors extended to your ancestors when they first arrived fleeing religious oppression. I don’t think that’s a very unreasonable thing to
ask.” Mellinger, supra note 94.
The failure of laws and government officials to recognize and
protect sacred sites may also be viewed as a distributive justice issue since the religious and cultural values of Native Americans are
not provided the same treatment accorded to the values of European Americans.
95. Exec. Order No. 13007, 61 Fed. Reg. 26771 (1996), reprinted in 42
U.S.C.A. §1996 (2000). The order does not create any new right,
benefit, or trust responsibility. Id. §4.
96. See Foster, supra note 70, at 805-07. Professor Foster argues that
both racial paternalism and cultural imperialism arise where government agencies or those with environmental interests do not respect
the right of a tribe to make its own decisions. Id. at 806. “[I]n Indian
country, a vision of environmental justice must include the tribal
right of self-government. . . . This means that tribal governments
must be involved in performing the full range of functions that governments are expected to do in protecting the environment: making
the law, implementing the law, and resolving disputes.” Suagee, supra note 33, at 572.
The National Environmental Justice Advisory Council has issued
a draft guidance on consultation and public participation issues relating to tribal governments and environmentally impacted tribal communities. National Environmental Justice Advisory Council, U.S. EPA, Working Draft—Guide on Consultation
and Collaboration With Indian Tribal Governments and
the Public Participation of Indigenous Groups and Tribal
Citizens (Aug. 1999).
97. See Amended Complaint Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, Re:
Louisiana Dep’t of Envtl. Quality/Permit for Proposed Shintech Facility, No. 04R-97-R6 (July 16, 1997) (on file with author) (documenting public participation problems); Motion to Recuse DEQ Officials, In re Shintech, Inc. and Its Affiliates (LDEQ Mar. 6, 1998)
(on file with author) (same); see also Luke W. Cole, Civil Rights, Environmental Justice and the EPA: The Brief History of Administrative Complaints Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 9 J.
Envtl. L. & Litig. 309, 326-69 (1994) (documenting similar procedural concerns plead by complainants in the nine Title VI complaints
accepted for investigation by EPA as of September 1994).
98. Lolis Eric Elie, A Call From the Governor, Times-Picayune (New
Orleans, La.), Sept. 4, 1998 at B-1. The governor also characterized
environmental regulation as a form of harassment against honest
businesses and called EPA “our only enemy” when it questioned the
state’s behavior during the Shintech permitting process. Ed Anderson, Foster Likes Casino Deal’s Chances in Special Session,
Times-Picayune (New Orleans, La.), Mar. 1, 1998, at A-10; A Welcome Focus on Environment, Advocate (Baton Rouge, La.), Oct.
28, 1997, at 18B.

analysis, with 28 technical appendices, of the likely environmental and social impacts of the huge project within a
day of its submission and instructing state employees to “be
sure we do everything we can to prevent them [Shintech opponents] from tying up the permit application process,”99
but also the surreptitious use of an employee in the office of
the secretary of the Louisiana Department of Environmental
Quality (LDEQ) to organize a local group to support
Shintech and the use of taxpayer funds and state employees
to investigate and compile dossiers on plant opponents.100
The governor derided community environmental justice
leaders, mostly women, as “a bunch of housewives” who
should not be making public policy.101
One judge noted, after reviewing allegations of over 40
instances of bias by the state in the permitting process, that
the LDEQ official in charge of issuing the air permits had
specifically instructed his staff to treat the local residents as
adversaries of the state agency.102 The local parish government, during the time it was considering a request by
Shintech for a coastal use permit, used taxpayer funds to
mail an anonymous flyer to local residents urging them to
support Shintech.103 The parish president also secretly compiled dossiers for Shintech detailing the race, sex, and attitudes of 18 parish officials whose approval was needed in
order to build the plant; the dossiers were destroyed when
plant opponents sought to obtain a copy.104
Efforts to limit the ability of Shintech opponents to participate in the decisionmaking process even included threats
by the governor to cut off Tulane University’s tax-exempt
status and efforts to get business interests to boycott the university, all because the school’s environmental law clinic
was providing free legal assistance to local residents.105
99. See Motion to Recuse DEQ Officials, supra note 97; Ed Anderson &
Chris Gray, Foster Endorses Probes of Shintech Adversaries,
Times-Picayune (New Orleans, La.), Nov. 7, 1997, at A-3; Vicki
Ferstel, Shintech’s Opponents Tracked, Advocate (Baton Rouge,
La.), Nov. 5, 1997 at 1A; Memorandum from Kevin P. Reilly Sr.,
Louisiana Dep’t of Economic Development, to Harold Price, Louisiana Dep’t of Economic Development (Nov. 15, 1996) (on file
with author).
100. Motion to Recuse DEQ Officials, supra note 97; Vicki Ferstel,
Groups Want DEQ Officials Off Shintech Case, Advocate (Baton
Rouge, La.), Dec. 9, 1997, at 1A; Chris Gray, State Favors Shintech
Plant, Opponents Say, Times-Picayune (New Orleans, La.), Dec.
9, 1997, at B-3.
101. John McQuaid, Burdens on the Horizon, Times-Picayune (New
Orleans, La.), May 21, 2000, at J-5. Governor Foster is quoted as
saying: “This [actions by female environmental justice activists] is a
great way to stop development, but that is not good public policy. If
you want a bunch of housewives making public policy, that’s a good
approach.” Id; see generally Robert R.M. Verchick, In a Greener
Voice: Feminist Theory and Environmental Justice, 19 Harv.
Women’s L.J. 23, 27 (noting that women dominate the leadership
and ranks of grass-roots environmental justice organizations).
102. Written Reasons for Judgment, St. James Citizens for Jobs & the
Env’t v. Louisiana Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, No. 448928 (19th La.
Dist. Ct. Aug. 31, 1998) (on file with author).
103. Ron Nixon, Toxic Gumbo, S. Exposure, Summer/Fall 1998, at 11,
14 (parish president’s office anonymously mailed pro-Shintech
flyer, using public funds, to more than 400 parish residents on a job
waiting list).
104. Leah Bankston, Economic Development or Environmental Racism?, Gris Gris (Baton Rouge, La.), Jan. 1998, at 17; Vicki Ferstel,
Shintech Plans Draw Environmentalist Suit, Advocate (Baton
Rouge, La.), June 14, 1997, at 1B.
105. Marcia Coyle, Governor v. Students in $700M Plant Case, Nat’l
L.J., Sept. 8, 1997, at 1; Susan Hansen, Backlash on the Bayou, Am.
Law., Jan./Feb. 1998, at 50; Marsha Shuler, Foster: Threat Against
Tulane Is Appropriate, Advocate (Baton Rouge, La.), July 24,
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Frustrated with Tulane’s refusal to back down, the governor
and business interests later were successful in pressing a
majority of the elected justices of the Louisiana Supreme
Court to impose new restrictions on the state’s law clinics
that would prevent them from providing free legal assistance to communities raising claims of environmental injustice.106 Although local residents complained to EPA that
Louisiana’s widespread actions to discourage local residents and their attorneys from raising environmental justice
claims violated the Agency’s regulation prohibiting any
person from intimidating, threatening, coercing, or discriminating against any individual or group because they have
participated in any way in a Title VI investigation, EPA has
failed to act on the complaint.107
In addition to the procedural justice issues arising from
the manner in which the state handled the permitting process, the Shintech case illustrates the ex ante obstacles that
people of color and lower income communities confront.
Under the state permitting process, the permit applicant has
an automatic right, if requested, to an adjudicatory hearing,
yet local residents have no such right.108 In the view of the
LDEQ, the permit applicant may also, upon a minimal
showing that the proceeding lacks the appearance of com1997, at 1A. For an extended discussion of the ethical and social issues implicated in the attack on Tulane, see Robert R. Kuehn,
Denying Access to Legal Representation: The Attack on the
Tulane Environmental Law Clinic, 4 Wash. U. J.L & Pol’y (forthcoming 2000).
106. Frontline: Justice for Sale (PBS television broadcast, Nov. 23,
1999); Chris Gray, Court Reins in Student Lawyers, Times-Picayune (New Orleans, La.), June 18, 1998, at A-1; Mark Schleifstein,
Foster, Clinics Face Off on Rules, Times-Picayune (New Orleans,
La.), Aug. 2, 1998, at A-1; Peter Joy, Political Interference With
Clinical Legal Education, 74 Tul. L. Rev. 235 (1999); 60 Minutes
II: Buying Judges? (CBS television broadcast, Mar. 27, 2000).
107. See Letter from Lisa W. Lavie & Robert R. Kuehn, Tulane Envtl.
Law Clinic, to Michael Mattheisen et al., EPA (Dec. 9, 1997) (on file
with author) (documenting efforts of Governor Foster and his staff to
intimidate and threaten the Tulane Environmental Law Clinic and its
clients); Letter from Elizabeth Teel, Tulane Envtl. Law Clinic, to
Ann E. Goode, Director, Office of Civil Rights, EPA (Aug. 10,
1999) (on file with author) (further detailing efforts by state to
threaten, intimidate, and discriminate against complainants and
their attorneys and protesting failure of EPA to take action on the
complaint); see also 40 C.F.R. §7.100 (EPA’s Title VI anti-interference regulation).
A similar, but also unaddressed, complaint of intimidation and
discrimination against Louisiana residents raising environmental
justice claims was filed with EPA over the actions of an LDEQ employee who showed up uninvited at a community meeting in Alsen,
disrupted the meeting, and was abusive and insulting toward local
residents. North Baton Rouge Envtl. Ass’n et al., Complaint Under
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, supra note 52; see Mike Dunne,
Group Claims DEQ Staff Disrupted Meeting, Advocate (Baton
Rouge, La.), May 26, 1998, at B-1. Unidentified persons have also
made unlawful threats and efforts to intimidate the leaders of the
Chester, Pennsylvania, movement for environmental justice. See
Foster, supra note 70, at 822-23.
108. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §30:2024 (West 2000) (if the LDEQ does
not provide the requested adjudicatory hearing, the permit applicant
may obtain de novo judicial review of the agency’s decision); In re
Carline Tank Servs., Inc., 626 So. 2d 258, 261 (La. App. Ct. 1993)
(decision to grant an adjudicatory hearing to someone other than the
permit applicant is strictly within the discretion of the LDEQ).
The LDEQ even argues that local residents who submit written
comments on a proposed permit are not entitled to notice of the
agency’s final permit decision, except for any notice printed in the
legal classified advertising section of the official state newspaper,
and that the period for any appeal by local residents of an LDEQ decision begins to run when the permit applicant, not the affected residents, receives notice of the decision by certified mail. See In re
Natural Resources Recovery, Inc., 752 So. 2d 369, 373-75 (La.
App. Ct. 2000).
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plete fairness, force the recusal of an agency decisionmaker
and have a neutral, third-party appointed to decide the merits of the permit application; again, local residents have no
such right.109 Thus, the process is designed to accord more
procedural rights to a permit applicant, even where the applicant is not a state resident, property owner, or taxpayer
and employs no person in the state, than it does to citizens
who have lived in the affected area all their lives, own
homes in the area, send their children to schools in the area,
and work in the area.
The county’s handling of a permit to build a hazardous
waste incinerator near the Hispanic community of
Kettleman City, California, illustrates the procedural barriers often encountered by ethnic communities. Despite
the repeated, strong interest expressed by Hispanic-speaking residents to participate in the permitting
process, environmental impact documents, meeting notices, and public hearing testimony were never provided
in Spanish. The court in El Pueblo Para el Aire y Agua
Limpio v. County of Kings110 held that the meaningful involvement of local residents was effectively precluded by
the failure to provide Spanish translations and set aside
the local permit. When similar translation concerns were
raised by Vietnamese-speaking residents regarding efforts to reopen the Marine Shale hazardous waste incinerator in Amelia, Louisiana, the state responded that it
would take care of the inability of the Vietnamese community to participate in the public hearing process after
the permit was issued.111
Implications of Procedural Injustice
An unresolved aspect of procedural justice is whether a fair
process can negate a claim that a disproportionate outcome
is unjust. Some argue that if the decisionmaker has given
impartial attention to and consideration of competing
claims to different benefits, an outcome would not be unjust
even if the result were to subordinate one group to another.112 A number of states have argued that, provided the
109. See In re Rollins Envtl. Servs., Inc., 481 So. 2d 113, 119 (La. 1985)
(permit applicant may obtain recusal of LDEQ official upon showing that the agency proceeding lacks the appearance of complete
fairness); In re Shintech & Its Affiliates, 734 So. 2d 772 (La. App.
Ct.) (citizens may not obtain judicial review of the LDEQ’s denial of
their request that, because of bias, agency must recuse itself from the
permitting decision), writ denied, 746 So. 2d 601 (La. 1999).
110. 22 ELR 20357 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 30, 1991); see also Luke W.
Cole, The Struggle of Kettleman City for Environmental Justice:
Lessons for the Movement, 5 Md. J. Contemp. Legal Issues 67
(1993-1994).
111. See Petition—Thinh Cau, Oct. 10, 1991 (on file with author) (petition to LDEQ from members of local Vietnamese community complaining that they have been prevented from participating in the permit proceedings); Mark Schleifstein, DEQ Clears Waste Burner,
Times-Picayune (New Orleans, La.), Feb. 23, 1999, at A3 (final
LDEQ permit includes requirement that emergency notifications
also be made in Vietnamese); Electronic mail from Julie Delaune to
Robert R. Kuehn (May 9, 2000) (the LDEQ repeatedly told local
residents they would deal with their concerns after the permits
were issued).
112. See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 167 (2d ed. 1994) (arguing that a disparate distribution of benefits may be considered just if
impartial attention was given to competing claims to the benefits);
Michael Greenberg, Proving Environmental Inequity in Siting
Locally Unwanted Land Uses, 4 Risk 235, 236 (1993) (if appropriate criteria are applied to every area, then the results of the siting decision are fair even if they disproportionately burden some groups
and benefit others).
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state establishes a collaborative process to address environmental justice concerns, the state should either be immune
from citizen complaints alleging violations of Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act or EPA should accord some deference to
the state in judging an action’s legality under Title VI.113
While environmental justice requires, at a minimum, a
procedurally just process, the emphasis on disparate effects,
rather than discriminatory intent, in the Executive Order,
Principles of Environmental Justice, and Title VI’s implementing regulations indicates that a fair process alone will
not negate claims of distributive injustice.114 In addition, because communities have so little satisfaction with the processes and criteria employed in existing decisionmaking
models, even if the process were carried out with perfect
fairness, the use of an inherently biased model would lead
many to believe that procedural and distributive injustices
still prevail. Without an agreement in advance by all affected parties on a fair process, procedural, as well as distributive, justice will remain elusive.
Although there has been a great deal of discussion
about the need to reform existing public participation
models and although many government agencies now
recognize their failure to ensure meaningful participation
by disadvantaged populations, EPA’s refusal to require
that waste facilities and permitting agencies “make all
reasonable efforts to ensure equal opportunity for the
public to participate in the permitting process,”115 the antagonistic attitudes of some state officials toward allegations of environmental justice,116 the hostility of environmental justice critics toward government grants to community groups for environmental education and outreach
efforts,117 and the assertions by some regulated entities
that increased public participation is not appropriate118 do
not bode well for finding consensus on the format of a fair
decisionmaking process or for avoiding future allegations of procedural injustice.
113. See, e.g., Title VI Implementation Advisory Committee, supra
note 59, at 26-29; New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, “New Jersey Proposal for State Involvement in Environmental
Equity Process” (undated) (on file with author); but see Office of
Civil Rights, U.S. EPA, Draft Title VI Guidance for EPA
Assistance Recipients Administering Environmental Permitting Programs, §II.C (EPA refuses to defer to a state’s non-Title VI approaches but will accord “due weight” in appropriate circumstances to the results of analyses submitted by states).
114. See Draft Revised Title VI Guidance, supra note 52, §II (“it is
possible to have a violation due to discriminatory public health or environmental effects without the presence of discrimination in the
public participation process.”) EPA also notes that it is possible to
have a violation of Title VI based solely on discrimination in the procedural aspects of permitting without a finding of discrimination in
the substantive outcome of that process. Id.
115. 60 Fed. Reg. 63417, 63420 (Dec. 11, 1995) (dropping language from
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act public participation regulations due to concerns that the proposed language “was ambiguous,
making compliance with the requirements difficult to evaluate and
enforce, and could engender disputes and litigation”).
116. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 98 (Louisiana governor refers to
EPA as “our only enemy” because of its investigation of environmental justice complaints filed against the state); David Mastio,
Engler Fights EPA Policy, Detroit News, Sept. 2, 1998, at B1
(Michigan governor “intends to go on the offensive” against EPA’s
environmental justice policy).
117. See, e.g., David Mastio, EPA Aids Activists Groups, Detroit News,
June 5, 1998, at A1.
118. See, e.g., Fracas at Roundtable Shows Pitfalls of Public Involvement, Industry Says, Inside EPA, Oct. 25, 1996, at 20.

Environmental Justice as Corrective Justice
The third aspect of justice encompassed by the term environmental justice is “corrective justice,” a notion of justice
that is sometimes referred to by other names and may be subsumed within claims for distributive or procedural justice.
The Meaning and Relevance of “Corrective Justice”
“Corrective justice” involves fairness in the way punishments for lawbreaking are assigned and damages inflicted
on individuals and communities are addressed. Aristotle referred to this aspect of justice as “rectificatory” as “it treats
the parties as equals and asks only whether one has done and
the other suffered wrong, and whether one has done and the
other has suffered damage”; if so, it attempts to restore the
victim to the condition she was in before the unjust activity
occurred.119 Corrective justice involves not only the just administration of punishment to those who break the law, but
also a duty to repair the losses for which one is responsible.120
The Executive Order on environmental justice reflects
notions of corrective justice by directing agencies to develop strategies to promote enforcement of health and environmental statutes in minority and low-income populations
and to collect, maintain, and analyze information on the
race, national origin, and income of populations surrounding facilities or sites that become the subject of a substantial
federal enforcement action.121 EPA’s environmental justice
definition encompasses corrective justice concerns in
calling for “fair treatment . . . with respect to the development and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies.”122
The Principles of Environmental Justice express a strong
corrective justice theme, calling for all producers of toxins
and hazardous waste to be held strictly accountable for detoxification and defining environmental justice as protecting the right of victims of environmental injustice to receive
full compensation and reparations for damages, as well as
quality health care.123 Similarly, Dr. Bullard’s environmental justice framework invokes corrective justice in placing
the burden of proof on those who seek to pollute and in redressing existing inequities by targeting enforcement and
cleanup actions.124
Therefore, as reflected in claims made in the environmental justice context, corrective justice encompasses
many aspects of wrongdoing and injury and includes the
concepts of “retributive justice,”125 “compensatory jus119. Ellen Frankel Paul, Set-Asides, Reparations and Compensatory Justice, in Nomos XXXIII: Compensatory Justice 97, 100-01 (John
W. Chapman ed., 1991) (citing Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics,
1132a, 4-7 (Martin Ostwald trans., 1962)).
120. Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, 27 Ariz. L.
Rev. 15, 30 (1995).
121. Exec. Order No. 12898, supra note 6, §§1-103(a), 3-302(b).
122. Memorandum from Barry E. Hill, supra note 8.
123. Principles of Environmental Justice, supra note 12, at nos. 6, 9.
124. Bullard, Environmental Justice for All, supra note 13, at 10.
125. Norman E. Bowie, Towards a New Theory of Distributive
Justice 4 (1971). The concept of retributive justice is reflected in
the notion “that fairness to citizens who make sacrifices by obeying
the law requires that violators be punished rather than reap benefits
for disregarding legal standards.” Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, 74
J. Crim. L. & Criminology 343, 349 (1983).
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tice,”126 “restorative justice,”127 and “commutative justice.”128 I adopt the term corrective justice here because environmental justice seeks more than just retribution or punishment of those who violate legal rules of conduct. Corrective justice is also preferred over the phrase compensatory
justice because the latter term may imply that, provided
compensation is paid, an otherwise unjust action is acceptable. It is also important to note that although some concepts
of corrective justice view fault or wrongful gain as a necessary condition for liability,129 environmental justice principles impose responsibility for damages regardless of fault
(e.g., the polluter-pays principle). Corrective justice, therefore, is not used in the narrow Aristotelian rectificatory
sense but instead in a broader, applied sense that violators be
caught and punished and not reap benefits for disregarding
legal standards and that injuries caused by the acts of another, whether a violation of law or not, be remedied.
Some actions that raise questions of corrective justice
may also implicate distributive or procedural justice. Evidence that environmental laws are enforced less often or less
stringently in certain communities could be an issue of distributive justice since an environmental program benefit,
enforcement, is not equally distributed to all populations.
Lax enforcement also can reflect a failure of government officials to treat all persons with equal concern and respect and
a failure to ensure procedural justice.130
Despite the overlap, viewing corrective justice as a distinct notion of environmental justice is preferable since environmental justice is concerned not just with unequal enforcement by government agencies but also with private
party conduct that may damage individuals or communities
yet not be subject to any possible governmental enforcement action. For example, toxic tort lawsuits and community requests for relocation may not implicate the government or rise to the level of a violation of the law. In addition,
injury may occur to communities of color and lower incomes even where the process for making an environmental
decision appears to be fair (i.e., where a claim of procedural
126. Paul, supra note 119, at 102-03; Been, supra note 60, at 1047 &
n.248. Compensatory justice attempts “to bring the victim to the condition he would have been in, or its equivalent, had the injurious
event never occurred.” Paul, supra note 119, at 103.
127. Richard O. Brooks, A New Agenda for Modern Environmental Law,
6 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 1, 27 (1991). Professor Brooks distinguishes
corrective justice (correction of environmental abuses) from retributive justice (retribution or punishment for environmental abuses or
violations) and restorative justice (the fair restoration of nature). Id.;
see also Thomas M. Hoban & Richard O. Brooks, Green Justice: The Environment and the Courts 167-68 (1996). Aristotle’s rectificatory justice is also restorative in that “it attempts to restore the victim to the condition he was in before the unjust activity
occurred.” Paul, supra note 119, at 101.
128. See Taylor, supra note 1, at 537. According to Professor Taylor,
“corrective or commutative justice” is “concerned with the way individuals are treated during a social transaction.” Id.; see also John
Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights 177-84 (1980) (tracing the origins of and explaining the term “commutative justice”).
129. For a discussion of the differences among philosophers and legal
scholars on the role of fault or wrongful conduct in defining corrective justice, see Heidi M. Hurd, Correcting Injustice to Corrective
Justice, 67 Notre Dame L. Rev. 51 (1991).
130. Kaswan, supra note 1, at 238 (“To the extent governmental decision-makers place less priority on enforcement in communities of
color and low-income communities, these communities may not receive ‘equal concern and respect.’”); Bullard, Overcoming Racism
in Environmental Decisionmaking, supra note 1, at 12 (“Procedural
equity refers to fairness—that is, to the extent that . . . enforcement
are applied in a nondiscriminatory way.”).
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injustice is not present) and it is important that such damages are addressed within an environmental justice scheme.
Allegations of Corrective Injustice
Indigenous populations in South America assert that U.S.
oil companies have unjustly damaged their health and natural resources and have asked U.S. courts to order the companies to clean up the damages caused by oil development
and to compensate local residents for their injuries.131
Farmworkers in Latin America allege that pesticide manufacturers, by exporting pesticides banned for use in the
United States, have caused sterility, birth defects, and cancer and seek monetary damages; the pesticide companies
argue that they violated no U.S. environmental laws and
deny the allegations.132 The city of Philadelphia contended
that it was too poor to spend $200,000 to clean up 8 million
pounds of toxic ash from the city’s municipal waste incinerator that was illegally dumped on a Haitian beach 10
years ago.133
The most publicized national empirical review of the corrective justice aspects of environmental justice is the 1992
study of EPA enforcement by the National Law Journal,
“Unequal Protection—The Racial Divide in Environmental
Law.”134 The National Law Journal reviewed all EPA civil
enforcement actions between 1985 and 1991 and found that
the average penalties imposed for violations of environmental laws in “white” areas (defined as the quartile with the
highest white population) were 46% higher than in “minority” areas (the quartile with the lowest white population).135
Looking at income, the study found that the average penalties imposed for violations of all environmental laws were
52% higher in “high-income” communities (the quartile
with the highest median household income) than in “low income” communities (the quartile with the lowest median
household income), although this pattern varied so markedly depending on the particular environmental law examined that the authors concluded that “the income of a community is not a reliable predictor of whether those who pollute will be dealt with more harshly.”136
Two subsequent reviews of EPA enforcement actions
have questioned the National Law Journal’s findings. Mark
Atlas, relying on a more refined EPA enforcement database
and using different measures of income and race, found that
“there is no evidence that violations of environmental laws
in areas that are disproportionately minority or low income
131. See, e.g., Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 29 ELR 20181 (2d Cir.
1998); Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61 (S.D. Tex. 1994);
Robert F. Kennedy Jr., Oriente Diary: Amazon Crude, Amicus J.,
Spring 1991, at 24; Anita Parlow, Worlds in Collision, Amicus J.,
Spring 1991, at 33.
132. See Schemo, supra note 26.
133. Philadelphia Dumps on the Poor, Rachel’s Env’t & Health
Wkly., Apr. 23, 1998. The ash, falsely characterized as fertilizer,
was dumped from the infamous vessel “Khian Sea” after a 14-month
voyage in search of a country that would accept the waste. Id. After
lying on a Haitian beach for more than a decade, the toxic ash was recently dug up, put on barges, and shipped to the United States for disposal—not in Philadelphia but, after being rejected by Georgia and
Florida, in Louisiana. Mike Dunne, Philadelphia Garbage Ash La.
Bound, Advocate (Baton Rouge, La.), May 2, 2000, at 1-A.
134. Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection—The Racial Divide in Environmental Law, Nat’l L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S1.
135. Id. at S2.
136. Id. at S2, S4.
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tend to be penalized less than violations elsewhere.”137 He
concluded that EPA penalties were most influenced by the
characteristics of the case, not of the communities surrounding the facilities.138 Professor Evan Ringquist’s review of
EPA civil cases confirmed the conclusions of the National
Law Journal that EPA fines were higher in white areas than
in minority areas from 1986 to 1991, but found that fines in
minority areas were higher during the 1974-1985 and
1974-1991 time periods.139 He concluded that minorities are
not disadvantaged by judicial enforcement case outcomes,
and the case for class bias in outcomes is weak.140 The few
studies of racial discrimination in environmental enforcement at the state level are conflicting.141
Regarding the cleanup of waste sites, the National Law
Journal study found that Superfund sites in minority areas
took 20% longer to be placed on the national priorities list
(NPL) than sites in white areas and that EPA chose less protective remedies at minority sites.142 The study also found a
difference between rich and poor communities in the pace of
cleanup and permanence of remedies selected, but not as
great as the differences between minority and white communities.143 Professors Hamilton and Viscusi likewise concluded that EPA Superfund cleanups were less stringent for
sites in communities with a higher percentage of minorities,
finding that while there was not much difference in the pace
of cleanup, regulators did treat sites differently in terms of
the cleanup remedies selected and the cost expended per
cancer case averted based on the racial characteristics of the
community exposed.144 Other published studies of EPA’s
enforcement of the Superfund program have found that: eligible rural poor sites were placed on the Superfund NPL at
half the rate of sites in other areas, but they were receiving
the same level of EPA attention for site inspections and

emergency removal actions145; the higher the percentage of
black population around a Superfund site, the less likely it is
that EPA has yet issued a record of decision146; the pace of
cleanup depended not on socioeconomic factors but mostly
on the site’s potential hazard147; and neither the level of contamination deemed to require cleanup nor the level of permanence in the remedies chosen by EPA was related to the
racial composition or median income of the communities
surrounding Superfund wood preservation sites.148
The theme of corrective justice also figures prominently
in the efforts of indigenous people to achieve environmental
justice. Native Americans have long complained that the
federal government and mining and oil companies have
failed to take responsibility for and address contamination
caused by their nuclear testing and resource development
activities on Indian lands.149 In addition, hundreds of open
dumps, many originally operated by the Indian Health Service, currently exist in Indian country and are in need of
cleanup.150 The recent, expanded ability of tribes to obtain
authority to implement federal environmental laws presents
tribal governments with the opportunity to promote corrective justice by directly enforcing compliance with environmental statutes on tribal lands, rather than having to rely on
federal agencies, yet finding the financial and technical resources to carry out that authority remains a problem.151

137. Mark Atlas, Rush to Judgment: An Empirical Analysis of Environmental Equity in U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Enforcement Actions 43 (2000) (unpublished manuscript on file
with author).
138. Id.
139. Evan J. Ringquist, A Question of Justice: Equity in Environmental
Litigation, 1974-1991, 60 J. Pol. 1148, 1153-54 (1998).
140. Id. at 1162. Atlas alleges that Ringquist’s misunderstandings of
EPA’s enforcement database and of the substantive aspects of EPA’s
civil judicial enforcement actions, as well as questionable or erroneous methodological decisions, mean that the results “cannot be relied upon to address the question of what factors, including environmental equity characteristics, affect penalties.” Atlas, supra note
137, at 21.
141. See Robert R. Kuehn, Remedying the Unequal Enforcement of Environmental Laws, 9 St. John’s J. Legal Commentary 625, 628-34
(1994) (discussing national and state empirical studies of possible
unequal enforcement of environmental laws); see also Been, supra
note 35, at 25D-30 (discussing a study by the Virginia General Assembly finding that waste facilities in minority communities tended
to be inspected less frequently than facilities in other communities
and, when inspections revealed violations, the median length of time
facilities took to comply was approximately nine months longer in
predominantly minority communities).
142. Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 134, at S2, S6.
143. Id. at S2, S4.
144. James T. Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi, Calculating Risks: The
Spatial and Political Dimensions of Hazardous Waste
Policy 187-88 (1999). As to the issue of the distribution of risks,
their study also found that minorities are more likely to be exposed to
hazardous waste sites. Id. at 186. The authors view these results as
consistent with their theory that those who are less politically active
(such as communities with high minority population percentages)
receive less environmental protection in the remediation process. Id.
at 183.

147. John A. Hird, Environmental Policy and Equity: The Case of
Superfund, 12 J. Pol’y Analysis & Mgmt. 323, 335-37 (1993).

145. Clean Sites, Hazardous Waste Sites and the Rural Poor: A
Preliminary Assessment 45-46, 48-49 (1990).
146. Rae Zimmerman, Social Equity and Environmental Risk, 13 Risk
Analysis 649, 660-61 (1993); see also Rae Zimmerman, An
Environmental Equity Study for Inactive Hazardous
Waste Sites 69-72 (1994) (finding no relationship between the
timing of the steps in EPA’s Region II Superfund cleanup process
and the racial, ethnic, or income characteristics of the site’s surrounding population).

148. Shreekant Gupta et al., Do Benefits and Costs Matter in Environmental Regulation? An Analysis of EPA Decisions Under
Superfund, in Analyzing Superfund: Economics, Science,
and Law 83, 93-94 (Richard L. Revesz & Richard B. Stewart eds.,
1995) (reviewing records of decisions only for NPL sites involving
wood preserving and PCB contamination); Shreekant Gupta et al.,
Paying for Permanence: An Economic Analysis of EPA’s Cleanup
Decisions at Superfund Sites, 27 Rand J. Econ. 563, 577 (1996)
(same). For a discussion of various studies of possible racial and
class disparities in EPA’s implementation of the Superfund program, see Kuehn, supra note 141, at 634-38.
149. See, e.g., Schwab, supra note 12, at 321-30 (1994); Goldtooth, supra note 32, at 143; William P. Robinson, Uranium Production and
Its Effects on Navajo Communities Along the Rio Puerco in Western
New Mexico, in Race and the Incidence of Environmental
Hazards: A Time for Discourse 153 (Bunyan Bryant & Paul
Mohai eds., 1992); Sanchez, supra note 32, at 11; Valerie Taliman,
Healing Global Wounds, 3 Race, Poverty & Env’t, Fall 1992, at
18; Margaret L. Knox, Their Mother’s Keepers, Sierra, Mar./Apr.
1993, at 50; John McQuaid, Uranium Held Promise, Curse,
Times-Picayune (New Orleans, La.), May 23, 2000, at A-8.
150. Dean B. Suagee, Turtle’s War Party: An Indian Allegory on Environmental Justice, 9 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 461, 473-79 (1994). Professor Suagee argues that too much attention has been given to the
problem of waste merchants trying to peddle their wares in Indian
country and not enough paid to the problem of how to clean up existing dumps. Id. at 477.
151. See Pamela A. D’Angelo, Waste Management Industry Turns to Indian Reservations as States Close Landfills, 21 Env’t Rep. (BNA)
1607, 1610 (Dec. 28, 1990); Suagee, supra note 33, at 577-78;
Suagee, supra note 150, at 477-79. Authorizing tribes to enforce federal environmental laws may also be viewed as a procedural justice
issue since it enhances their ability to make decisions that affect the
health and welfare of tribal members.
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Local efforts to achieve corrective justice are illustrated
by community efforts to address contamination from lead
smelters in West Dallas—“[t]he classic example of government inaction and callous disregard for the law.”152 As early
as 1972, Dallas officials were aware of significantly elevated lead levels in the blood of children living in a minority
neighborhood near a lead smelter that had repeatedly violated the law.153 EPA’s own study in 1981 confirmed the high
lead concentrations in children living near the smelters.154 In
spite of repeated complaints by local residents, government officials took no action; EPA even rejected a voluntary cleanup plan, preferring still further tests of local children and suggesting that spreading dirt and planting grass
would be sufficient.155 To local residents, their requests for
action to address the illegal activities were “ignored because they were poor, black, and politically powerless.”156
Finally, after 50 years of operation without necessary local
permits and 20 years after government officials became
aware of the public health problems caused by the illegally
operated smelter, authorities closed the facility and started
a comprehensive cleanup program.157 Residents made similar charges of racism against state officials over the
nine-year delay in cleaning up arsenic contamination on
the Kingsley Park Playground in an African-American
area of Buffalo.158
A number of communities of color and lower income residents have alleged that government agencies have failed to
enforce environmental laws in their communities. Residents
of the 130-year-old African-American community of
Oakville, Louisiana, filed a Title VI complaint with EPA alleging that the LDEQ has failed to provide them with corrective justice.159 On over 40 different occasions since 1985,
152. Bullard, Environmental Racism and “Invisible” Communities, supra note 4, at 1043.
153. Bullard, Dumping in Dixie, supra note 1, at 47-48; Regina Austin & Michael Schill, Black, Brown, Poor & Poisoned: Minority
Grassroots Environmentalism and the Quest for Eco-Justice, 1
Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y, Summer 1991, at 43, 45. The lead smelter,
owned by RSR Corporation, was located next to an elementary
school and across the street from a 3,500-unit public housing project
and day care center. Bullard, Environmental Racism and “Invisible”
Communities, supra note 4, at 1043.
154. Bullard, Dumping in Dixie, supra note 1, at 48.
155. Bullard, Environmental Racism and “Invisible” Communities, supra note 4, at 1043.
156. Bullard, Dumping in Dixie, supra note 1, at 49. A West Dallas
community leader argued that had the lead smelter been located in
one of the affluent, white areas of Dallas, EPA would have promptly
closed the facility. Id. West Dallas residents filed a lawsuit alleging
that numerous hazardous waste sites in their community would have
been addressed but for the fact that a majority of West Dallas residents are members of racial and ethnic minority groups. See West
Dallas Coalition for Envtl. Justice v. United States, No.
Civ.A.3:91-CV-2615R, 1999 WL 102810 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 22, 1999)
(holding that plaintiff’s Administrative Procedure Act, Fifth
Amendment, and racial discrimination claims are not barred by
§113(h) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §9613(h), ELR Stat. CERCLA
§113(h)).
157. Bullard, Environmental Racism and “Invisible” Communities, supra note 4, at 1044.
158. David Thigpen, The Playground That Became a Battleground,
Nat’l Wildlife, Feb./Mar. 1993, at 14; Jerry Zremski, Congress
Told of Kingsley Park Poisons, Buffalo News, Feb. 26, 1992, at
A-10. Residents complained that the cleanup still did not address
deeply buried concentrations of lead or include long-term health
testing of residents. Id.
159. Letter from Percy Johnson, President, Oakville Community Action
Group, to Dan Rondeau, Office of Civil Rights, EPA et al. (May 22,
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agency inspectors documented violations of environmental
laws at the adjacent Industrial Pipe waste facility, yet the
LDEQ has not issued a single penalty nor, in spite of a 1988
closure order, forced the site to shut down.160 The LDEQ has
even failed to take action against the facility for submitting,
as the state itself found, a forged waiver of a 200-foot buffer
zone requirement allegedly signed by an adjacent landowner.161 The forged waiver not only misspelled the landowner’s name, but the man was deceased (for over three
years) at the time the waiver was supposedly executed.162
Title VI complaints from communities in Texas and California also allege a lack of enforcement of environmental laws
by the state, both at individual sites and as part of a pattern of
lax enforcement.163
Efforts to achieve corrective justice through relocation or
buyouts are increasingly common. In New Orleans, residents living on top of the Agriculture Street Landfill allege
that the federal government, through a redevelopment program designed to turn the working poor into homeowners,
enticed unsuspecting African Americans to buy homes on
the old landfill.164 Although EPA later designated the residential area a Superfund site, the federal government has
refused to buy out the homes of nearby residents, forcing
them to remain in their homes during cleanup and to live
thereafter in homes protected only by two feet of new soil
and a permeable mesh mat from buried hazardous wastes
such as lead and arsenic.165 Reportedly, it would cost
EPA $8 million less to relocate the residents permanently than to proceed with the Agency’s partial removal
1996) (on file with author) (EPA Title VI Complaint No. 3R-96-R6).
See also Sandra Barbier, Oakville Activist Fights Landfill; Racial Injustice Claims Investigated by EPA, Times-Picayune (New Orleans, La.), July 14, 1999, at B-1.
160. See Letter from M. Madeleine Boshart & Andres R. Jacques, Tulane
Envtl. Law Clinic, to Clarice Gaylord & Shirley Augurson, EPA
(Apr. 21, 1997) (on file with author) (includes exhibit documenting
results of LDEQ inspections); Letter from Frank Trainor & Elizabeth Teel, Tulane Envtl. Law Clinic, to Clarice Gaylord & Shirley
Augurson, EPA (Dec. 12, 1997) (on file with author) (alleging that
the company has a long history of violating state and local permits
and of failing to comply with mandated corrective measures, yet the
LDEQ has failed to take any enforcement action).
161. Amended Notice of Intent to Revoke Permit, LDEQ, No.
SE-O-96-0153A (Aug. 15, 1996); Letter from H.M. Strong, Assistant Secretary, LDEQ, to Kennett Stewart, Industrial Pipe,
Inc. (Sept. 27, 1996) (rescinding amended notice of intent to revoke permit).
162. Letter from M. Madeleine Boshart & Andres R. Jacques, supra
note 160.
163. See Cole, supra note 97, at 363 (Mothers Organized to Stop Environmental Sins (MOSES) alleges that the Texas Natural Resources
Conservation Commission’s (TNRCC’s) unenforcement of environmental laws against the Gibralter Chemical facility violates Title
VI); Two Environmental Groups File Civil Rights Complaint
Against TNRCC Over Air Permits, 30 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 1715 (Jan.
1, 1999) (reporting on Title VI complaint alleging that the failure of
the TNRCC to prevent pollution violations at the Crown Central Petroleum facility is part of a pattern of lax enforcement by the state);
Residents of Sanborn Court, Complaint Under Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act, No. 2R-95-R9 (Aug. 3, 1995) (alleging, among other Title VI violations, lack of enforcement against facility adjacent to migrant labor housing complex).
164. See Christi Daugherty, Digging Up Dirt, Gambit Wkly. (New Orleans, La.), Nov. 3, 1998, at 20; John McQuaid, Living a Nightmare,
Times-Picayune (New Orleans, La.), May 23, 2000, at A-10; Responsibility for Ag Street, Times-Picayune (New Orleans, La.),
Sept. 6, 1998, at B-6.
165. Id.
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of the contaminated soil. 166 The Agricultural Street residents have not been successful, thus far, in forcing EPA
to relocate them. 167
A number of communities have been successful in obtaining relocation. In Escambia County, Florida, EPA
agreed to move over 350 families living adjacent to a dioxin-contaminated Superfund site.168 In Texarkana, Texas,
African-American owners of homes built on contaminated
land obtained a congressional appropriation for relocation,
but unsuccessfully challenged on racial discrimination
grounds the compensation paid by the federal government
for their homes.169 Recently, government agencies agreed
to relocate residents of a housing project in Portsmouth,
Virginia, after a lawsuit was filed alleging that forcing the
residents to live on a Superfund site violated their constitutional rights.170
Petrochemical companies facing potential liability for
personal injuries and property damages have bought out the
African-American communities of Morrisonville,
Reveilletown, Good Hope, and Sunrise in Louisiana, and,
financed primarily by the city, state, and federal governments, the working poor community of Wagner’s Point
in Baltimore.171
Another increasingly popular approach to corrective justice is toxic tort suits. In a lawsuit for injuries allegedly suffered as a result of a tank-car explosion in New Orleans, attorneys for the plaintiffs successfully argued to the jury that
punitive damages should be imposed because of the defendants’ attitude toward the surrounding minority neighbor166. Daugherty, supra note 164. EPA states it will only consider relocation when it is not possible to correct an environmental problem and
keep a community intact. Id.
167. See New Orleans v. Browner, No. CIV.A.99-0756, 1999 WL
179347 (E.D. La. Mar. 31, 1999) (rejecting, on jurisdictional
grounds, lawsuit challenging EPA’s cleanup remedy).
168. See Julie Hauserman, Relocations Near Toxic Sites Disputed, St.
Petersburg Times, Aug. 16, 1998, at 1B; Adam Nossiter, Breaking
Containment: Relocation Is Only Alternative Neighbors of Polluted
Site Desire, Chi. Trib., Jan. 5, 1997, at 5K. At the urging of the National Environmental Justice Advisory Council, EPA issued an interim policy on permanent relocations at Superfund sites. 64 Fed.
Reg. 37011 (July 8, 1999). U.S. EPA, Interim Policy on the Use
of Permanent Relocations as Part of Superfund Remedial
Acts (June 30, 1999) (available from the ELR Document Service,
ELR Order No. AD-4205).
169. See Boyd v. Browner, 897 F. Supp. 590, 593-94 (D.D.C. 1995) (dismissing Title VI and Fair Housing Act claims against EPA and the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers), aff’d, 107 F.3d 922 (D.C. Cir.
1996).
170. Parties to Public Housing Suit Agree to Settlement Requiring Buildings’ Demolition, Daily Env’t Rep. (BNA), Feb. 16, 2000, at A-10
(referring to the settlement in Washington Park Lead Comm. v.
EPA, No. 2:98:421 (E.D. Va.)). The plaintiffs alleged that the site,
immediately adjacent to a lead foundry, was chosen in the 1960s
only because it was to be public housing for African Americans and
that the government’s proposed cleanup remedy perpetuates and exacerbates conditions originally imposed by the policies and practices
of de jure segregation. Id.
171. Louisiana Advisory Committee, U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights, The Battle for Environmental Justice in Louisiana . . . Government, Industry, and the People 46-52 (1993);
Heather Dewar & Joe Mathews, Residents Want Out of Industrial
Ghetto, Balt. Sun, Apr. 19, 1998, at 1A; Taylor, supra note 1, at
555; see also Anne Rochell Konigsmark, Louisianans Want Oil Giant to Buy Out Homes, Atlanta Const., Nov. 5, 1999, at C-2 (reporting on efforts of residents living next to the Motiva/Shell refinery in Norco, Louisiana, to get the company to buy out their
homes); Joe Mathews, Paying Neighbors to Move, Balt. Sun,
Dec. 6, 1998, at 1A (noting the efforts to buy out the community of
Mossville, Louisiana).

hood before and after the explosion. Over objections that
plaintiffs’ attorneys had improperly used inflammatory racial rhetoric, the jury returned a punitive damages award of
$2.5 billion against the railroad company, a verdict that was
later reduced to $850 million.172 African Americans in
Bogalusa, Louisiana, similarly alleged that race was a factor
in the evacuation of residents after a gas leak at a Gaylord
Chemical Corporation plant, charging that punitive damages were in order because the town’s black neighborhoods
were evacuated much later than the predominantly white
neighborhoods.173 Residents of Kennedy Heights in Texas
likewise used a toxic tort suit to press their claim that homes
were marketed to them because the contaminated property
could not be sufficiently cleaned up to sell to white buyers;
the case settled in 1999 for $8 million.174
Implications of Corrective Injustice
The National Environmental Justice Advisory Council
has recommended a number of actions to strengthen government enforcement in minority and low-income areas,
including targeting EPA enforcement in these communities, increasing state identification of and enforcement in
minority and low-income neighborhoods, enhancing
tribal enforcement resources, and fostering the ability of
communities to monitor compliance and enforce environmental laws.175 EPA determined in 1994 that there is
“broad authority” available to the Agency under existing
environmental laws to address environmental justice issues in enforcement.176 Thus, when it comes to greater
governmental efforts to address allegations of corrective
injustice, the issue is not generally one of lack of legal authority but rather lack of resolve. As environmental justice advocate Richard Moore sees it: “We don’t have the
complexion for protection.”177
172. Court Cuts Damages in Tank-Car Explosion From $2.5 Billion to
$850 Million, CSX Says, Daily Env’t Rep. (BNA), Nov. 18, 1999, at
A-12; Pamela Coyle, Gentilly Tank Car Damages Slashed; State
Judge Finds Award Excessive, Times-Picayune (New Orleans,
La.), Nov. 6, 1999, at A-1; Margaret Cronin Fisk, $2.5 Billion in
Punitives Pared in La. Rail Explosion Case, Nat’l L.J., Nov. 29,
1999, at A11.
173. Glen Justice, Group: Gas Leak Response Racist, Times-Picayune
(New Orleans, La.), Oct. 29, 1995, at B-1. “There is a pattern of total
disrespect by the chemical plant for the black community. How do
we change this? One way is compensatory damages—make them
pay. I also suggest punitive damages. We want to punish them.” Id.
(quoting lawyer Paul Stephen Adams).
174. Environmental Justice: Tentative $8 Million Accord Reached in
Texas Environmental Racism Litigation, Daily Env’t Rep. (BNA),
Mar. 11, 1999, at A-1. The special master who negotiated the settlement stated that, although Chevron had agreed to establish a settlement fund to pay for property devaluation, the company had no legal
obligation to do so as there was no evidence of harmful contamination of the soil, water, or air. Id.
175. National Environmental Justice Advisory Council Enforcement Subcommittee, U.S. EPA, Achieving Environmental Protection: Compliance, Enforcement and Environmental Justice (Nov. 1995); National Environmental
Justice Advisory Council Enforcement Subcommittee, U.S.
EPA, Report of the Environmental Justice Enforcement
and Compliance Assurance Roundtable (Oct. 1996).
176. Memorandum from Howard F. Corcoran, Associate General Counsel, EPA, to Jean C. Nelson, General Counsel, EPA (Feb. 25, 1994).
For a discussion of remedies to unequal enforcement of environmental laws, see Kuehn, supra note 141, at 642-66.
177. Karl Grossman, The People of Color Environmental Summit, in Unequal Protection: Environmental Justice & Communities of
Color 272, 281 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1996) (quoting Richard
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The legal remedies available to people of color and lower
incomes to address corrective injustices on their own may
be of limited availability or utility. Lawsuits alleging inadequate enforcement by government agencies are often dismissed because of sovereign immunity, ripeness, or prosecutorial discretion defenses.178 Citizen suits by affected
communities against government entities or private firms
that do not comply with environmental laws are a possibility, but resource, procedural, and substantive constraints
limit their utility.179 The use of Title VI to address corrective
injustice is, as yet, unproven.180
Buyouts are not without controversy and are not universally sought by those living along the fencelines of industrial facilities. By merely moving residents away from polluting facilities, buyouts treat the community, rather than the
pollution, as the problem and dissolve long-standing communities. Most buyout agreements also require local residents to relinquish all claims for injuries resulting from
years of exposure to toxic pollutants, and many residents
complain that the amounts of money offered for their homes
do not fairly compensate them for relocating.
Using toxic tort suits to address claims of corrective justice likewise is not without significant problems. Commentators repeatedly warn of the limitations of using lawsuits to
address the underlying political and economic causes of environmental injustice.181 In addition, issues of proof, multiple sources of possible causation, a history of poor medical
care and lack of medical records, and risks associated with
dangerous occupations and different lifestyles “make it
more difficult for low-income minorities to prove to a middle-class jury that they have suffered harm as a result of
their environmental victimization.”182 While racial bias
and disparate treatment have been alleged in the toxic tort
suits noted above, rules of evidence may not allow consideration of such issues.183 Finally, even where the demo-

178.
179.

180.
181.

182.
183.

Moore, co-director of the SouthWest Organizing Project). Dr.
Bullard uses the phrase “invisible communities” to explain the failure to protect people of color and lower incomes. Bullard, Environmental Racism and “Invisible” Communities, supra note 4.
See Kuehn, supra note 141, at 648-58.
See Gauna, supra note 3, at 40-79. Professor Gauna proposes
strengthening the availability and effectiveness of citizen suits by
training communities to detect noncompliance, increasing attorney
fee awards to successful citizen suit plaintiffs, enhancing penalties
where there is a history of noncompliance in poor and minority communities, and creating nondiscretionary duties on agencies to address environmental justice issues. Id. at 79-86.
Draft Revised Title VI Guidance, supra note 52, §I.C (application of Title VI to allegations concerning enforcement-related matters will be addressed in future EPA guidance documents).
See, e.g., Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental
Protection: The Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 Ecology
L.Q. 619, 648-49 (1992); Luke W. Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation: Another Stone in David’s Sling, 21 Fordham Urb. L.J. 523,
541 (1994); Foster, supra note 70, at 819-20; Allan Kanner, Assisting Injured Individuals, in The Law of Environmental Justice 619, 620 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 1999).
Kanner, supra note 181, at 620.
See Serena M. Williams, The Fight for Environmental Justice: Is the
Courthouse the Appropriate Battleground?, 1 Pub. Interest L.
Rep., Spring 1996, at 17, 27; Karen Smith, How the Legal System
Has Failed the Environmental Justice Movement, 12 J. Nat. Resources & Envtl. L. 325, 341 (1996-1997). One legal scholar proposes a new tort of “racially disproportionate exposure to environmental burdens” that would explicitly allow consideration of evidence of racial bias and disparate impacts. Kathy S. Northern, Battery and Beyond: A Tort Law Response to Environmental Racism, 21
Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 485, 493 (1997).
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graphics of the affected community may be admissible, as
a toxic tort case in Louisiana demonstrated, white or more
affluent jurors may be biased against the efforts of minorities and those with lower incomes to seek monetary redress
for the damages caused by living in close proximity to industrial facilities.184
Just as communities will continue to press claims of corrective injustice, those charged with violating the law or
causing injuries will continue to deny such charges and to
contest the right of the communities for redress. Though
such denials are not unexpected, one overlooked benefit of
ensuring that communities receive more corrective justice is
that it could lessen opposition to the siting and permitting of
potentially harmful activities.185 As the Shintech case demonstrated,186 if local residents do not have assurances that
they will receive corrective justice, then government officials and regulated entities cannot expect communities to
welcome facilities that threaten their health and welfare.
Environmental Justice as Social Justice
The fourth and final aspect of justice implicated by the
term environmental justice is “social justice,” a far-reaching, and some say nebulous, goal of the environmental justice movement.
The Meaning and Relevance of “Social Justice”
Social justice is “that branch of the virtue of justice that
moves us to use our best efforts to bring about a more just
ordering of society—one in which people’s needs are
more fully met.”187 “The demands of social justice are . . .
first, that the members of every class have enough resources and enough power to live as befits human beings,
and second, that the privileged classes, whoever they are,
be accountable to the wider society for the way they use
their advantages.”188
184. See Rhonda Bell, Jury Sides With Shell Plant, Times-Picayune
(New Orleans, La.), Sept. 3, 1997, at A-1. One juror stated his concern that if the jury had awarded damages the residents might have
chosen to remain in the community and sue the plant again: “I kind of
wish they wouldn’t have dropped the relocation issues . . . . Since
they dropped that, it looked like they were just looking for the
money.” Id.; see also Allan Kanner, Environmental Justice, Torts
and Causation, 34 Washburn L.J. 505, 509 (1995) (“the poor and
minorities are less able to fend off allegations of having brought suit
to get ‘something for nothing’”).
185. See Title VI Implementation Advisory Committee, supra note
59, at 54 (allowing communities to assess the compliance of permitted facilities may ease community anxiety about the health and environmental risks posed by individual facilities).
186. See Chris Gray, Contamination Was Kept Quiet, Opponents Say,
Times-Picayune (New Orleans, La.), Feb. 19, 1998, at A-9 (the
LDEQ agrees, at Shintech’s request and in order not to harm “community relations,” to suppress information that the proposed plant
site is contaminated); Joe Macaluso, Where Does Foster Stand?,
Advocate (Baton Rouge, La.), Jan. 7, 1997, at 16C (Governor Foster: “I believe DEQ should not be policemen.”); Manuel
Roig-Franzia, Pollution Penalties Lowest in 10 Years, Times-Picayune (New Orleans, La.), June 12, 1998, at A-1 (pollution citations
and fines in Louisiana dropped to a 10-year low during Governor
Foster’s first full year in office).
187. Robert E. Rodes Jr., Social Justice and Liberation, 71 Notre Dame
L. Rev. 619, 620 (1996).
188. Id. at 626. Rodes observes that efforts to reform unjust institutions
and achieve social justice give rise to a class struggle: “The victims
have a stake in reform, while the beneficiaries have an equal stake in
the status quo.” Id. at 624.
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Environmental justice has been described as a “marriage
of the movement for social justice with environmentalism”
integrating environmental concerns into a broader agenda
that emphasizes social, racial, and economic justice.189 Dr.
Bullard refers to this aspect of environmental justice as “social equity: . . . an assessment of the role of sociological factors (race, ethnicity, class, culture, lifestyles, political
power, and so forth) in environmental decisionmaking.”190
Professor Sheila Foster has argued that a narrow focus on
issues of distributive justice neglects the search for social
structures and agents that are causing the environmental
problems.191 A social justice perspective presents environmental justice as part of larger problems of racial, social, and economic justice and helps illustrate the influence of politics, race, and class on an area’s quality of
life.192 This broader social perspective contrasts with traditional environmentalism and its narrower focus on wilderness preservation and the technological aspects of environmental regulation.193
Environmental justice’s focus on social justice reflects reality. As one community organizer explained, oppressed
people do not have compartmentalized problems—they do
not separate the hazardous waste incinerator from the fact
that their schools are underfunded, that they have no day
care, no sidewalks or streetlights, or no jobs.194 The reason
disadvantaged communities do not separate these problems
is that their quality of life as a whole is suffering and the political, economic, and racial causes are likely interrelated.
As the Reverend Benjamin Chavis observed, “Sometimes
we get too single-issue to see how various social justice issues are interrelated, . . . But in this movement, there is a perception at the grassroots level of how one manifestation of
racial injustice is related to another.”195
Social justice influences can work in two ways. The same
underlying racial, economic, and political factors that are re189. Dana A. Alston, Introduction, in We Speak for Ourselves: Social Justice, Race and Environment 3 (Dana Alston ed., 1990);
see also Gauna, supra note 3, at 12 (environmental justice activists
see environmental problems as only one part of the larger social issues of racism and cultural and economic injustice).
190. Robert D. Bullard, Unequal Environmental Protection: Incorporating Environmental Justice in Decision Making, in Worst
Things First? 237, 258 (Adam M. Finkel & Dominic Golding eds.,
1994); see also Bullard, Dumping in Dixie, supra note 1, at 116;
Bullard, Overcoming Racism in Environmental Decisionmaking, supra note 1, at 14.
191. Foster, supra note 70, at 790-92.
192. See Miller, supra note 54, at 714 (arguing that a political and historical perspective is important to understand how issues of race, socioeconomic class, and prejudice influence planning and development
processes); Peggy M. Shephard, Issues of Community Empowerment, 21 Fordham Urb. L.J. 739, 755 (1994) (arguing that urban
policy decisions involve struggles over the control of production and
distribution of profits and are really debates over resources and
power). To illustrate how environmental justice integrates social justice concerns, Professor Angela Harris explains that an environmental justice approach to crime would see it as one aspect of a larger
problem of social and economic justice and focus on building community. Angela P. Harris, Criminal Justice as Environmental Justice, 1 J. Gender, Race & Just. 1, 44 (1997).
193. Bullard, Dumping in Dixie, supra note 1, at 9-12; Gauna, supra
note 3, at 11-12; Taylor, supra note 1, at 523.
194. A Place at the Table, Sierra, May/June 1993, at 51, 58 (comments
of Scott Douglas, community organizer with the Sierra Club’s
Southeast Office); see also Bullard, supra note 14, at 282-84.
195. Marcia Coyle, When Movements Coalesce, Nat’l L.J., Sept. 21,
1992, at S10 (quoting Rev. Benjamin F. Chavis Jr., executive director of the United Church of Christ’s Commission on Racial Justice).

sponsible for the environmental threats to the community
also likely play a significant role in why the area may suffer
from other problems like inadequate housing, a lack of employment opportunities, poor schools, etc. In turn, the presence of undesirable land uses that threaten the health and
well-being of local residents and provide few direct economic benefits negatively influences the quality of life, development potential, and attitudes of the community and
may lead to further social and economic degradation.196
Government officials are often hesitant to embrace the
social justice aspects of environmental justice, reflecting a
reluctance to take on the broader systemic causes of environmental injustice or to consider issues outside the narrow
technical focus of the agency.197 Nonetheless, the President’s Executive Order acknowledges the significance of
social justice by directing each federal agency to consider
the economic and social implications of an agency’s environmental justice activities, and the memorandum accompanying the Executive Order requires analysis of the economic and social, not just environmental, effects of federal
actions on minority and low-income communities.198
EPA recognizes that environmental justice “is also inclusive, since it is based on the concept of fundamental fairness, which includes the concept of economic prejudices as
well as racial prejudices.”199 The Agency’s new draft guidance on Title VI provides that economic development from
the permitting action may justify an otherwise unlawful disparate impact if the benefits are delivered directly to the affected community.200
Not unexpectedly, the Principles of Environmental
Justice are grounded in ideals of social justice. They
broadly call for economic alternatives that contribute to
the development of environmentally safe livelihoods; political, economic, and cultural liberation; policies based
on mutual respect and justice for all peoples and free from
any form of discrimination; cleaning up and rebuilding
cities and rural areas; honoring the cultural integrity of
communities; and providing fair access for all to the full
range of society’s resources.201
Some criticize the environmental justice movement for
focusing on social and racial causes, arguing that, in the process, the movement overlooks the predominant role the
market plays in creating a community’s problems. To these
critics, the real cause of not only unjust environmental assaults but of other serious problems in people of color and
196. See Foster, supra note 70, at 786 (noting that a pattern of waste facilities in a community creates a reputation that adversely molds
the aesthetics and economy of the area, leading to further economic and social decline). Zulene Mayfield, an environmental
justice advocate in Chester, Pennsylvania, complained that although a waste incinerator was supposed to bring new businesses
to the town, the only new businesses have been prostitution and
drugs. Id. at 786.
197. See, e.g., U.S. EPA, Reducing Risk for All Communities, supra note 2, at 10 (acknowledging that socioeconomic factors may influence the inequitable distribution of environmental risks but characterizing such issues as “beyond the scope of this report”).
198. Exec. Order No. 12898, supra note 6, §1-103(a); Presidential Memorandum Accompanying Executive Order 12989, supra note 7.
199. Memorandum from Barry E. Hill, supra note 8.
200. Draft Revised Title VI Guidance, supra note 52, §VII.A.1; see
also Title VI Implementation Advisory Committee, supra note
59, at 81-89.
201. Principles of Environmental Justice, supra note 12, at pmbl., nos.
2, 12.
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lower income communities is lack of economic opportunity,
and the solution is not a discussion of race, class, or power
but ensuring that affected communities share in the economic benefits resulting from activities that may impose environmental risks.202 Environmental justice advocates obviously agree that the environmental problems of a community are often interlinked with other social problems and due
in large part to lack of economic opportunities. However,
they tend to be skeptical of market-based solutions, given
the historical failure of a market approach to protect or benefit disadvantaged communities, and argue that the long-term
viability of a community requires that issues of social justice
be identified and addressed.203
Moreover, as the examples below illustrate, it is through
allegations of social injustice that, as the market advocates
desire, communities broaden their focus beyond the facility’s pollution to include the role the polluting facility and
others may play in contributing to or solving the community’s interrelated social and economic problems.
Allegations of Social Injustice
Multinational corporations operating in developing countries increasingly must confront demands that they take a
greater role in the social welfare of the host communities. In
Nigeria, Mobil Oil finds itself under intense criticism not
just for pollution damages but also because it has failed to
address the potholed roads, rundown schools, lack of running water, and general impoverishment of the areas in
which it operates.204 Even though over 70% of the country’s
oil revenues go to the federal government, it is the oil companies’ lack of investment in the local communities, not the
government’s, that is most widely resented by local residents.205 Indigenous peoples in South America and Asia
have made similar allegations that multinational oil and
mining companies bring not only pollution but also severe
social disruption while, in return, providing few benefits to
local residents.206
Discussions of the social justice aspects of national environmental policies often focus on the fact that, as a result of
the vestiges of racist laws and policies, minorities possess
significantly less economic and political power, making it
“much more probable that racial minorities will receive an
unfavorably disproportionate share of the benefits (less) and
burdens (more) of living in society, including those associated with environmental protection.”207 These vestiges
202. See, e.g., Jaffe, supra note 60; Kent Jeffreys, Environmental Racism: A Skeptic’s View, 9 St. John’s J. Legal Commentary 677,
679 (1994); Lambert et al., supra note 38, at 9; Nelson Smith &
David Graham, Environmental Justice and Underlying Social Problems, 27 ELR 10568, 10568-69 (Nov. 1997).
203. See, e.g., Gauna, supra note 3, at 16 & n.51 (reporting on the Michigan Coalition’s criticism of EPA’s 1992 environmental equity report
for failing to mention housing discrimination, poverty, or imbalances in political access and power).
204. Roger Cohen, Mobil Spill Bares Ebb Tide of Nigerian Land, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 20, 1998, at 1.
205. As one local fisherman framed the social justice issue: “They
[Mobil] have been making a lot of money here, and we’ve been left
like monkeys out here in the swamp.” Id.
206. See, e.g., Parlow, supra note 131; Eyal Press, Freeport-McMoRan at
Home & Abroad, Nation, July 31, 1995, at 125; Greg Roberts, The
Battle of Freeport, Good Weekend (Sydney, Australia), Apr. 6,
1996, at 26.
207. Lazarus, supra note 76, at 808.
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manifest themselves in housing discrimination, residential
segregation, and education and employment policies that
compel minority populations to live, work, and play in more
polluted areas.208 These same factors “create[ ] the potential
for what some have dubbed ‘environmental blackmail,’ as
the community finds it more difficult to oppose the siting of
a facility that, notwithstanding significant environmental
risks, offers the possibility of immediate short-term economic relief.”209
Environmental justice advocates also argue that social injustice in national environmental protection policies is evidenced by the lack of people of color in governmental,
nongovernmental, and private-sector environmental organizations, by the failure of minorities to enjoy their fair share
of the jobs created by environmental protection, and by the
disproportionate number of jobs minorities lose as a result
of stricter environmental controls.210 One economist has
urged environmental justice advocates to focus even more
on social justice by emphasizing the positive effects that environmental restrictions can have on jobs, incomes, and economic growth.211
Brownfields implicate a number of justice concerns, including the role of brownfields redevelopment in advancing
social justice. Plans by developers and government entities
for redevelopment of the lower income, people of color
communities where brownfields are found often have failed
to create tangible benefits for local residents. Outside labor
is used to build the new facilities, full-time jobs either go to
outsiders or do not produce liveable wages, and through
“gentrification” poorer residents may no longer be able to
afford to live in the redeveloped community.212 The National Environmental Justice Advisory Council has called
for coordinating brownfields redevelopment with broader
social justice strategies of job creation and training, career
development, and local business startup and nurturing.213
Race-based influences on attitudes toward the concept of
environmental justice are revealed in a joint poll by the
American and National Bar Associations finding that, while
52% of African-American lawyers believe there is “very
much” racial bias currently in the justice system, only 6.5%
of white lawyers believe there is “very much” institutional
208. Bullard, Overcoming Racism in Environmental Decisionmaking,
supra note 1, at 6; see also Lazarus, supra note 76, at 808 (arguing
that the economic plight of many minority communities, compounded by the lingering results of racist policies, “confines its
members as a practical matter to the less healthy residential areas”).
209. Lazarus, supra note 76, at 808. Professor Lazarus cites as an example the statement by a utility company official on why the company
chose to site a nuclear power plant in an economically depressed
community: “The town is sort of down on its uppers; it’s sort of
poor. . . . They are a better kind of people to deal with.” Id. at 808
n.88.
210. Gelobter, supra note 24, at 843.
211. See Roger H. Bezdek, The Net Impact of Environmental Protection
on Jobs and the Economy, in Environmental Justice: Issues,
Policies, and Solutions 86, 106 (Bunyan Bryant ed., 1995).
212. John C. Chambers & Michelle A. Meertens, Community Participation in Brownfields Redevelopment, in Brownfields: A Comprehensive Guide to Redeveloping Contaminated Property
183, 185 (Todd S. Davis & Kevin D. Margolis eds., 1997).
213. Waste Facility Siting Subcommittee, National Environmental Justice Advisory Council, U.S. EPA, Environmental Justice, Urban Revitalization, and Brownfields: The
Search for Authentic Signs of Hope 37-38 (Dec. 1996); see
also Kirsten H. Engel, Brownfield Initiatives and Environmental
Justice: Second-Class Cleanups or Market-Based Equity?, 13 J.
Nat. Resources & Envtl. L. 317, 336 (1997-1998).
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bias.214 The attitudes of lawyers on environmental justice
show the same racial divide. While 83% of African-American lawyers believe that minority individuals should be able
to use civil rights laws to sue governments over decisions
that permit environmental polluters to operate in their
neighborhoods, only 42% of white lawyers believe they
should have such opportunity.215 These dramatic differences
in perspective, no doubt based in part on personal experiences, perhaps explain why some see social justice as a legitimate and necessary goal of environmental justice and
others see it as an inflammatory, unproductive side issue.
Native Americans have long struggled for social justice,
and the social justice issues arising out of their environmental disputes are rooted in the country’s history of colonialism
and threats to Native American cultures.216 A common complaint is that tribes and their members have enjoyed few of
the benefits from natural resource exploration and development on tribal lands.217 Recent efforts to site waste facilities
on tribal lands raise significant social justice disputes even
within tribes, as some members focus on the putative economic benefits from such facilities while others look to the
environmental and cultural damages that may result.218
Concerns about the employment aspects of social justice
figured prominently in some of the most publicized local environmental justice disputes. In the Shintech case, Louisiana offered Shintech, which was already realizing an annual
$750,000 per-employee after-tax profit at its comparable
PCV plant in Texas,219 a taxpayer-financed subsidy of almost $800,000 for each permanent job created.220 In return,
the state did not require Shintech, nor did the company commit, to hire any Convent, St. James Parish, or Louisiana resident, contractor, or supplier, though the company did pledge
to “comply with all applicable federal and state employment
laws.”221 Moreover, because of Shintech’s need for employees with computer knowledge and the low educational levels of most Convent residents, the staff director of the state
214. Terry Carter, Divided Justice, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1999, at 42.
215. Steven Keeva, Pursuing the Right to Breathe Easy, A.B.A. J., Feb.
1999, at 48, 49.
216. See Celene Krauss, Women of Color on the Front Line, in Unequal
Protection: Environmental Justice & Communities of Color
256, 267-69 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1996).
217. See, e.g., Knox, supra note 149, at 57; McQuaid, supra note 149;
Robinson, supra note 149, at 161.
218. Compare Kevin Gover & Jana L. Walker, Escaping Environmental
Paternalism: One Tribe’s Approach to Developing a Commercial
Waste Disposal Project in Indian Country, 62 U. Colo. L. Rev.
933, 935 (1992) (“Looking at the waste industry as a form of economic development, in many respects it can be a good match for
tribal communities.”), with Knox, supra note 149, at 57 (“Many projects come and go, all accompanied by big promises, but few Indians
have gotten richer from them.”); see also Jane Kay, Indian Lands
Targeted for Waste Disposal Sites, S.F. Examiner, Apr. 10, 1991,
at A-10.
219. See Louisiana Environmental Action Network, The Myth
of Shintech Jobs (Selling False Hopes to Local Residents)
(1998).
220. See Memorandum from Paul Adams, Louisiana Dep’t of Economic
Development, to Kevin Reilly, Secretary, Louisiana Dep’t of Economic Development (Mar. 24, 1997) (on file with author). The total
subsidy would be approximately $130 million; the plant would employ 165 permanent workers. Id.
221. See Shintech Inc., Environmental Economic Development Program
Agreement (undated) (on file with author). Shintech also agreed to
“provide equal opportunity to qualified citizens of St. James Parish
to compete for employment with Shintech at its new facility consistent with its staffing needs.” Id.

agency promoting the plant admitted that “very few” of
the permanent jobs created by the company would go to
local residents.222 This admission was consistent with a
job survey in an adjacent community that found that only
8.7% of almost 1,900 permanent jobs at 10 local chemical
plants were held by local residents, with just 1% held by
African Americans.223
Similarly, residents of West Harlem complain that although they are saddled with a disproportionate number of
New York’s sewage treatment plants, no minority contractors were hired to construct the most recent $1.1 billion
plant; the few local minorities that were hired as plant workers were all gone within a year.224 In the Genesee Power Station case, no minorities from the majority African-American area were hired to construct or were working at the $80
million plant, and the owners all resided outside the community.225 The judge found these facts “to be appalling” and
opined that, in permitting industrial facilities, society ought
to take into consideration that the people living in the polluted surrounding communities get no job benefits from the
plants.226 Robbins, Illinois, stands as an example of a town
that thought that its support of a new waste incinerator
would bring jobs and economic development but finds itself “arguably worse off than before” as the economic
benefits never materialized and the town is now “saddled
with a soaring, smoke-belching trash burner that shoos
away commercial investment like a scarecrow guarding
a cornfield.”227
Social justice is also implicated by taxpayer-subsidized
assistance to polluting firms that locate in people of color
and lower income communities. In the Shintech case, concerns over the minimal benefits to local residents were
heightened by information that approximately $27 million
that Shintech would otherwise pay in property taxes over a
10-year period to fund local schools would be exempted by
the subsidy.228 These tax breaks would cost each of the parish’s taxpayers over $10,000 in lost tax revenues otherwise
available for public schools.229 Opposition to the Select
Steel proposal in Flint, Michigan, also was fueled by concerns that the company was being provided with tax breaks
of more than $100,000 per job yet there was no guarantee
222. Memorandum from Paul Adams, supra note 220. A comparison
of the environmental “costs” with the job-creation benefits of
Shintech revealed that the company would emit 3,488 pounds of
toxic air pollution per year for each permanent job created, a ratio
two times higher than the rest of Louisiana’s chemical industry, almost four times higher than Texas’ industry, and almost seven
times higher than the U.S. chemical industry’s average. From
Plantations to Plants, supra note 46, at 23 (reprinting results
of “release/job” ratios calculated by Professor Paul Templet of
Louisiana State University).
223. East Iberville Parish & Town of St. Gabriel Employment Survey
(Sept. 1995) (on file with author); From Plantations to Plants,
supra note 46, at 22-23 (citing survey); Louisiana Environmental Action Network, supra note 219 (citing to Jan. 24, 1998, public hearing testimony of Leroy Alfred, former St. Gabriel Alderman); see also Chris Gray, Experts Say Shintech May Not Deliver
Jobs, Times-Picayune (New Orleans, La.), Jan. 25, 1998, at B-1.
224. Miller, supra note 54, at 713.
225. Transcript of Court’s Decision at 23-24, NAACP-Flint Chapter v.
Engler, No. 95-38228-CV (Genesee Cty. Cir. Ct. May 29, 1997).
226. Id. at 24.
227. Jon Jeter, Poor Town That Sought Incinerator Finds More Problems, Few Benefits, Wash. Post, Apr. 11, 1998, at A3.
228. From Plantations to Plants, supra note 46, at 24.
229. Louisiana Environmental Action Network, supra note 219.
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that any of the jobs would go to local residents.230 In the
Kettleman City case, of the $7 million that Chemical Waste
Management pays annually in taxes to the county for its existing landfill, little is spent in the Hispanic local community
targeted for the new hazardous waste incinerator.231
Of course, company officials believe that their operations
do help local employment and tax bases. Shintech countered
that even though it would receive $130 million in tax breaks,
it would pay over $6 million in one-time sales taxes during
construction and over $2 million per year thereafter.232 In the
Select Steel case, the Genesee Township treasurer argued that
it would gain more than $111,000 in tax revenues over 12
years from the plant, but also acknowledged that if the local
government gave the company all the tax abatements available and did all the infrastructure improvements “it would
probably cost the township money for Select Steel to come
here.”233 In almost all local environmental justice debates,
company, and often state, officials see the development activities as improving economic opportunities for local residents, not making their lives worse, and characterize environmental justice as a job killer that harms, not advances,
social justice in economically distressed communities.234
Local residents also note the social justice issues of racism and neglect by politicians that make their communities
so attractive to undesirable land uses. The 98% African-American community of Alsen, Louisiana, founded by
freed slaves shortly after the Civil War, finds itself in the
middle of an intensely polluted, heavily industrialized area
that contains 15 polluting facilities, 2 Superfund sites, and at
least 24 current and former landfills. In their Title VI complaint, the Alsen residents allege that one reason there are so
many petrochemical and waste facilities sited in their community is because the residential area was zoned heavy industry by white politicians at a time when the residents were
denied the right to vote because of their race.235 In the Louisiana Energy Services case, Forest Grove and Center
Springs residents noted that a history of neglect by local politicians made their community a prime target for the uranium enrichment plant. During the siting process, the company concluded that the community’s absence of stores,
schools, medical clinics and businesses, unpaved or poorly
maintained homes, lack of public drinking water, and segregated and substandard schools made it preferable to other
230. Julie H. Hurwitz, Executive Director, NLG/Sugar Law Center,
Written Statement to Environmental Justice Symposium (May 25,
1999) (unpublished statement on file with author and at Environmental Justice Issues Presented to Congressional Leaders (visited
Mar. 10, 2000) <http://www.ejrc.cau.edu/ejcongsyp.htm>).
231. Cole, supra note 110, at 76; Charles J. McDermott, Balancing the
Scales of Environmental Justice, 21 Fordham Urb. L.J. 689, 704
(1994).
232. Shintech Press Release (Nov. 20, 1996) (on file with author).
233. Jeff Karoub & Nick Chiappetta, Genesee Twp. Still Might Get Steel
Mill, Flint J. (Flint, Mich.), Mar. 3, 1999, at C1.
234. See, e.g., John LaPlante, Shintech’s Not Trashing Tulane, Advocate (Baton Rouge, La.), July 31, 1997, at 9B; Sherry Sapp, Foster
Plans Romeville Follow-Up, Advocate (Baton Rouge, La.), Aug.
5, 1997, at 1B; but see Bezdek, supra note 211 (urging environmental justice advocates to stress the positive effects that greater
environmental restrictions would have on jobs, income, and economic development).
235. North Baton Rouge Envtl. Ass’n et al., supra note 52, at 2 (citing
Florence T. Robinson, Problems Along the Mississippi: A Case
Study (Update, Jan. 8, 1998)); see also John McQuaid, Too Close for
Comfort, Times-Picayune (New Orleans, La.), May 21, 2000, at J-2.
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areas that enjoy greater public benefits and a higher quality
of life.236
Implications of Social Injustice
A common result of local struggles for environmental justice, and the expanded discussions of social justice problems that such struggles stimulate, is greater subsequent political involvement by local residents on a host of other social and political issues. For example, as a result of their involvement in the dispute over the proposed Louisiana Energy Services uranium enrichment plant, a member of the
local environmental justice organization was elected to the
Homer town council, another was elected to the parish school
board, a third now serves on the parish police jury, and a supporter was elected the first African-American mayor of
Homer.237 Elsewhere in Louisiana, the Carville/St. Gabriel residents who filed the first Title VI complaint accepted by EPA
were later able to incorporate the area as a means to obtain
greater control over future land uses and to ensure that more
benefits flowed to the local community.238 Similarly, the environmental justice struggle over the North River Sewage treatment plant in West Harlem has galvanized the community,
sparking the residents into action on other social problems and
increasing voter participation.239 The SouthWest Organizing
Project (SWOP), although focused on a range of environmental justice issues, has actively pursued voter registration, economic diversification, tax policies, employment discrimination, and other social justice issues since the early 1980s.240
These examples suggest that criticism of environmental
justice as too myopic and a diversion of scarce resources
away from other more important social and public health
problems is not well-founded.241 Most often, environmental
justice efforts do not wastefully divert a community’s attention but instead bring residents together to focus on a broad
array of social justice problems. These examples also indicate that government officials and firms seeking community
acceptance for environmentally risky projects must as a
practical, if not also moral, matter consider whether social
justice is served by their projects. For if the environmental
and other social burdens of a proposed project are imposed
on the local community while the economic and other benefits flow elsewhere, “community opposition will be fierce
and the chances for success lessened.”242
236. In re Louisiana Energy Servs., L.P. (Claiborne Enrichment Center),
45 N.R.C. 367, 386-88 (1997), 1997 WL 458771 (N.R.C.), 1997 NRC
LEXIS 20 (Atomic Safety and Licensing Board May 1, 1997), aff’d in
part & rev’d in part, 47 N.R.C. 77 (1998), 1998 WL 191132 (N.R.C.),
1998 NRC LEXIS 7 (Nuclear Regulatory Commission Apr. 3, 1998).
237. Electronic mail from Nathalie Walker, EarthJustice, to Robert R.
Kuehn (May 9, 2000).
238. Cole, supra note 97, at 329-30.
239. Miller, supra note 54, at 722.
240. See Taking Back New Mexico, 4 Race, Poverty & Env’t, Fall
1993, at 30.
241. See Foreman, supra note 11, at 115-36; but see Ringquist, supra
note 37, at 251 (comparing Foreman’s attack on environmental justice to criticizing crime policy for diverting attention and resources
away from education because the latter may have a larger effect on
addressing certain social ills than the former).
242. McDermott, supra note 231, at 704. Chemical Waste Management’s
director of government affairs acknowledged the importance of addressing social justice concerns in arguing that those most affected
by a proposed site need better access to the benefits created
“[o]therwise, as in this case [Kettleman City], community opposition will be fierce and the chances for success lessened.” Id.
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Conclusion
The pervasiveness of environmental justice concerns in current policy debates is illustrated by recent congressional
hearings on the federal government’s $7.8 billion plan for
the restoration and preservation of the Everglades. In the
midst of discussions about the need to take corrective action
to protect species of rare or endangered plants and animals,
African-American and Hispanic congresswomen expressed
concerns about effects on low-income and minority populations and questioned the distributive, procedural, and social
justice impacts of the plan.243 Noting that only 10 out of 4,000
pages of an impact study considered low-income and minority concerns, the congresswomen asked whether some interests were being treated more favorably than others and questioned why there was no effort to ensure that low-income
and minority persons could participate in the economic benefits of the restoration. In a sense, the proponents of the plan
had neglected to evaluate their proposal from an expanded
environmental justice perspective, with the predictable result
that some were now questioning the fairness of the proposal.
The four-part taxonomy presented in this Article offers a
means to ensure that environmental justice concerns are ap243. Impact of Restoration Project on Minority, Poor Citizens Should Be
Weighed, Panel Told, Daily Env’t Rep. (BNA), Mar. 3, 2000, at A-9.

propriately integrated into environmental decisionmaking.
While some may contend that analyzing environmental
justice through its constituent notions of justice simply
broadens the already ambitious scope of the problems
that environmental justice encompasses, this taxonomy
also suggests a path to avoid environmental injustice—government officials and private entities undertaking activities with environmental impacts on peoples
of color and lower incomes must address the distributive, procedural, corrective, and social justice aspects of
their actions.
As the allegations of injustice set forth in this Article
demonstrate, the proponents of the facilities that have triggered many of the most highly publicized environmental
justice disputes have not sought to ensure that their proposals did justice to the impacted communities, with the predictable result that the projects failed to win the support of
the communities. Compliance with the law, while perhaps
sufficient to gain necessary government approvals or avoid
the imposition of legal liability, is no longer sufficient if one
wishes to achieve environmental justice. This taxonomy offers the opportunity for greater awareness of what justice
means to impacted people of color and lower income communities and to help them attain the liveable communities
and improved environmental conditions that are the shared
goals of all Americans.

